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81 
ESSAY 
REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT:                                  
DEMOCRACY INDEX RULEMAKING 
David Fontana 
INTRODUCTION 
In his magisterial The Ages of American Law,1 Grant Gilmore described 
three main periods in the history of American law.  American 
administrative law has gone through three periods in its modern history 
similar to Gilmore’s three eras.2  First came an effort to justify the very 
existence of the administrative state, similar to Gilmore’s discussion of the 
“Age of Discovery.”3  Next, as with Gilmore’s “Age of Faith,”4 a larger 
number of individuals started to believe in the power of reason and 
objective principles; in administrative law, this “Age of Faith” was 
characterized by a belief in superior technical expertise as the reason for the 
existence of agencies.5  With the rise of Gilmore’s “Age of Anxiety”6 and 
the resultant loss of faith, administrative law turned to an “interest 
representation” model, in which the administrative state was viewed as 
 
   Law Clerk, The Honorable Dorothy W. Nelson, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.  My thanks to the following individuals for helpful comments or conversations 
on this or related issues:  Bruce Ackerman, Michael Asimow, William Funk, Stephen 
Galoob, Daniel Ho, Abigail Krauser, Nickolai Levin, Ronald M. Levin, Matthew Lindsay, 
Jeffrey Manns, Neysun Mahboubi, Jerry Mashaw, Nicholas Parrillo, Matthew Spence, Kate 
Stith, and Nicholas Stephanopoulos.  Thanks are also due to participants in “The 
Administrative Procedure Act at 58:  Is There a Case for Amending It” panel at the 
Southeastern Association of American Law Schools meeting in August of 2004 for 
comments on an earlier version of this Essay. 
 1. Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (1977). 
 2. This characterization of the ages of administrative law is subject to the same 
problems of overbreadth that Gilmore’s categories are. Id. at 16 (“All generalizations are 
oversimplifications.  It is not true that, during a given fifty-year period, all the lawyers and 
all the judges are lighthearted innovators, joyful anarchists, and adepts of Llewelyn’s Grand 
Style . . . .”).  
 3. Id. at 19-40. 
 4. Id. at 41-67. 
 5. Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission 51 (1955); 
James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 23-24 (1938); Daniel J. Gifford, The New 
Deal Regulatory Model:  A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 299, 
306-07 (1983). 
 6. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 68-98. 
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legitimate because it operated as a micro-political process that went out of 
its way to incorporate all sorts of affected interests.7 
Now, though, we have entered a new age of administrative law, one that 
features an increasing number of articles and books stating that 
administrative law and public governance in general should focus on the 
admirable goal of direct public participation.  Many of these interesting 
proposals, though, are so broad in their scope and so legally coercive in 
their nature as to make them normatively undesirable.  This Essay instead 
argues in favor of a more limited and optional—and hence more 
normatively desirable and realistic—system of administrative law in the 
context of informal administrative rulemaking, what I call “democracy 
index rulemaking.”  The basic idea behind democracy index rulemaking is 
simple:  The more public participation in the promulgation of an agency 
rule, the more deference that rule should receive when it is challenged in 
court. 
How would this system work?  An agency deciding which legislative rule 
to promulgate would have a choice between what I will call “normal notice 
and comment” (“NNC”) rulemaking and what I will call “deliberative 
notice and comment” (“DNC”) rulemaking.  If the agency decided to use 
NNC rulemaking, the greater the number of relevant and non-repetitive 
comments the agency received, the more deference its actions would 
receive if its rule was challenged in court.  If the agency decided to use 
DNC rulemaking, the rulemaking process would involve a series of 
administrative jury deliberations (juries featuring stakeholders and members 
of the general public).  Due to the extra participation it involves, an agency 
choosing to use deliberative rulemaking would be guaranteed special 
deference from the courts.  The choice between these forms of rulemaking 
would remain entirely up to the agency. 
With such a system in place, we would encourage, but not require, 
agencies to invite broad discussion and public participation about their 
proposed rules, certainly a virtue, by promising them more lenient judicial 
review.  This potential participation would supply agencies with a degree of 
legitimacy and a reservoir of information that would help them with their 
responsibilities, but would do so while maintaining a substantial degree of 
respect for agency autonomy.  In other words, we could have many of the 
pluses of participation in administrative rulemaking without enduring so 
many of the minuses. 
Surprisingly, there has been no scholarship advocating anything like this 
sort of system for administrative rulemaking.  The Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act of 1990 contemplates special procedures to involve non-agency 
members in rulemaking.8  These special procedures, though, only permit 
the participation of a tiny number of affected elite interest groups, in 
 
 7. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1669, 1675 (1975) (“The traditional model of administrative law thus conceives of the 
agency as a mere transmission belt for implementing legislative directives . . . .”). 
 8.  Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 570 (2000). 
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contrast to the various procedures that would be used in democracy index 
rulemaking.  There has been relatively little discussion of encouraging 
negotiated rulemaking by providing negotiated rules with special treatment 
when they face judicial review.9  As a practical matter, then, negotiated 
rulemaking has been of only marginal importance, since it has been used far 
less than one percent of the time in rulemaking.  In a similar vein, Bruce 
Ackerman has noted that moments of heightened democratic participation 
in constitutional law may result in certain “constitutional moments”10 that 
should be treated with special reverence by courts, but these moments occur 
so infrequently that they are not really workable principles for daily 
governance like the democracy index rulemaking idea is.  Even beyond 
that, of course, Ackerman is trying to describe a proper interpretation of the 
Constitution, and his idea has not been extended to the administrative law 
context.11 
Part I of this Essay first introduces the current regime of notice and 
comment rulemaking, then turns to the specifics of democracy index 
rulemaking, explaining how it would work using either the NNC process or 
the DNC process, and how judicial review would function at each stage of 
this new system of rulemaking.  Part II then turns to a discussion of why 
this system of administrative rulemaking would be normatively preferable 
to the existing regime, building on the arguments first advanced in Part I.  
Part III defends democracy index rulemaking from its potential critics. 
I.  DEMOCRACY INDEX RULEMAKING 
This part introduces the current regime of administrative law, before 
turning to the specifics of democracy index rulemaking and how democracy 
index rulemaking changes the current regime.  As this part discusses, even 
with the special rules regarding participation in notice and comment 
rulemaking, all of the relevant empirical studies demonstrate that 
participation in rulemaking is infrequent and selective.  The democracy 
index rulemaking system tries to increase participation by creating a two-
tier process.  An agency can decide to use NNC, which would be more or 
less the same notice and comment process agencies use now, with the only 
difference being that judicial review would be determined by the number of 
 
 9. Id. (“A rule which is the product of negotiated rulemaking and is subject to judicial 
review shall not be accorded any greater deference by a court than a rule which is the 
product of other rulemaking procedures.”); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations:  A 
Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1, 106 (1982) (briefly mentioning this possibility); Lawrence 
Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 Yale J. 
on Reg. 133, 164 (1985) (same); Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes:  
A New Role for the Courts?, 10 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 19 (1985) (offering a short rebuttal to 
Harter’s comment). 
 10. 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People:  Foundations (1991); 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the 
People:  Transformations (1998). 
 11. For one small but possible exception, see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 
576, 587 (2000) (stating that deference would be due to agency rules that were “arrived at 
after” notice and comment and not after less democratic procedures). 
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relevant and non-repetitive comments the agency received.  Alternatively, 
an agency could use the special DNC process and automatically qualify for 
extra deference. 
A.  Notice and Comment Rulemaking 
If an agency decides to issue a legislative rule,12 it must generally 
promulgate this rule following the requirements of section 553 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).13  Agencies must give notice of the 
proposed rulemaking, provide parties that might want to submit a comment 
a chance to do so, and must eventually include a statement of basis and 
purpose in the final rules that they adopt.14  If the agency follows this 
procedure, then the final result is a “legislative” rule with the full force of 
law.15 
Reading the language of the APA would not give one a true sense of the 
requirements that an agency using section 553 faces.  The generic language 
of section 553, requiring agencies to give “notice,”16 has been interpreted to 
require agencies to explain the general factual rationale for the 
contemplated rule.  Along the same lines, for the agency rule to avoid being 
termed “arbitrary and capricious,”17 the agency would presumably face 
some sort of obligation to develop at least a minimal record as a result of 
the notice and comment process. 
In addition to these mandatory obligations that an agency faces, if 
individuals or institutions want to participate in the rulemaking process, 
agencies face a series of additional obligations.  Although section 553 only 
mandates that the notice of proposed rulemaking must state the “time, place 
and nature” of the comment period, agencies generally must allow a 
reasonable period of time to pass for comments to be submitted, as an 
executive order states that most rulemaking “should include a comment 
period of not less than 60 days.”18  If the agency eventually decides to 
promulgate a rule that is not the “logical outgrowth”19 of the proposed rule,  
the final rule may be invalid.  The cure for violations of any of these proto-
 
 12. This Essay only focuses on legislative rules, and does not touch on deference for 
other rules.  Because deliberative deference is more desirable for agencies than the forms of 
deference that other types of rules receive, it should be expected that agencies will once 
again be attracted to informal rulemaking. 
 13. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).  Rulemakings carried out under § 553 are referred to as 
“informal” rulemakings.  When a statute requires that a rule be made “on the record,” a 
“formal” rulemaking is conducted under §§ 556 and 557 instead. See id. §§ 556, 557. 
 14. Id. § 553(b)-(c). 
 15. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, 
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311, 
1322, 1327-28 (1992) (stating the requirements for a rule to qualify as “legislative”). 
 16. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 17. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 18. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 
638-42 (2000). 
 19. E.g., Chocolate Mfg. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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section 553 requirements is quite frequently an entirely new notice and 
comment period.20 
All of these procedural requirements on agencies have led many to agree 
with Kenneth Culp Davis’s statement that rulemaking is “one of the greatest 
inventions of modern government.”21  Davis is at least partly right, but all 
of the empirical research on public participation in agency rulemaking 
demonstrates that participation is minimal, of low quality, and dominated 
by powerful interests.  Cornelius Kerwin, for instance, studied all rules 
published in the Federal Register between December 1990 and June 1991, 
leading to a total of 1985 rules examined.22  Kerwin found that a bare 
majority of these rules triggered any sort of participation at all.23  When 
there was participation, the majority of participation was by a series of 
repeat player interest groups.24 
The most telling study regarding the scope of participation might still be 
the 1977 report prepared by the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Governmental 
Affairs.25  It studied the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”), the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”), the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”), the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”), the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to identify the most significant ten of each agency’s 
last thirty rulemakings.26  In six out of eight FPC rulemakings, there was no 
general public participation, and in the other two proceedings the ratio of 
regulated industry to other participation was between 4:1 and 12:1.27  In the 
FDA rulemakings that were examined, fewer than half involved 
participation by any interests outside of regulated interests, and where 
parties or persons outside of regulated interests were involved,28 the ratio of 
industry to public interest participation was between 12:5 and 61:2.29  
These disparities were true of the other agencies that were studied as well.30 
 
 20. E.g., Nat’l Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 21. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 283 (1970). 
 22. Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking:  How Government Agencies Write Law and 
Make Policy 191-210 (1994). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 3 Staff of S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., Study on Federal 
Regulation:  Public Participation in Regulatory Agency Proceedings 12 (Comm. Print 1977) 
[hereinafter Senate Report] (“Unfortunately, little data of a comprehensive nature is 
available.  Each agency compiles its data differently, and in the case of several agencies, few 
figures were available at all.”); Kerwin, supra note 22, at 192 (noting that empirical studies 
of agency rulemaking “are as rare as hens’ teeth”). 
 26. Senate Report, supra note 25, at 13-17.  It should be noted that this report also 
looked at the last ten most significant adjudications. See id. 
 27. Id. at 13. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 14-16.  The Committee’s conclusion was that “[o]n the whole, the data clearly 
shows that participation by public or nonregulated interests before Federal regulatory 
agencies is consistently exceeded by the participation of regulated industries, and often 
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Steven P. Croley has studied the interaction of outside groups with the 
White House.31  In 1993, President Clinton issued an executive order 
requiring recordkeeping of White House communications with groups 
regarding rules under consideration.  So, the White House’s Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs keeps a document tracking all 
communications between the White House and nongovernmental interests 
concerning rulemaking.32  By studying this information,33 Croley found that 
business interactions outnumbered other interactions by a total of three to 
one.34 
What could be done to change this unfortunate state of affairs?  Public 
participation carries varying degrees of legal coercion.  On one hand, 
however broad or narrow the scope of the actual participation and the 
agency role in facilitating such participation, we already have at our 
intellectual disposal the idea that participation can be legally mandatory.  
Another way of structuring participation might authorize such participation 
but make it essentially optional.  Take, for instance, the case of the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (“NRA”).35  Pursuant to the NRA, of 
course, representatives of an agency and of interested organizations that 
will be affected by a potential regulation meet and negotiate the final text 
and content of the rule.36  Agencies might face a policy incentive to use 
 
constitutes only a tiny fraction of such industry participation.” Id. at 10.  The Committee 
further stated that “[t]hese findings also lend support to the suggestion that participation in 
agency decisionmaking processes is greater among those who can afford significant 
expenditures, and furthermore that more parties can afford to participate in informal 
rulemaking than in adjudication.” Id. at 14-15.  The Committee also stated the following: 
  In sum, we found that in agency after agency, participation by the regulated 
industry predominates—often overwhelmingly.  Organized public interest 
representation accounts for a very small percentage of participation before Federal 
regulatory agencies.  In more than half of the proceedings, there is no such 
participation whatsoever.  In those proceedings where participation by public 
groups does take place, typically, it is a small fraction of the participation by the 
regulated industry. 
Id. at 16. 
 31. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:  Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1998). 
 32. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 
638-42 (2000). 
 33. Croley, supra note 31, at 140.  Croley states: 
For the purposes of this study, the [Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(“OIRA”)] meetings log was analyzed by tabulating the number and affiliations of 
attendees at OIRA meetings convened for discussing pending major rules.  Based 
on data collected from the docket room of the [Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”)], OIRA personnel attended a total of 166 meetings between July 19, 
1993 (following the issuance of Executive Order No. 12,866) and May 6, 1997, 
with a total of 1,889 attendees. 
Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2000).   
 36. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook 5 (1990) 
[hereinafter Reg. Neg. Sourcebook]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 594 (providing statutory 
background). 
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negotiated rulemaking, for the reasons that prompted its enactment—
concerns about saving time and preventing legal challenges to rules.  In 
some instances, agencies might sense that Congress wants them to use 
negotiated rulemaking, although so far Congress has either explicitly 
required negotiated rulemaking or indicated no view on the matter. 
Policy or practical reasons aside, there is no clear legal obligation that 
agencies face to use negotiated rulemaking.  Indeed, an administrative 
agency has almost complete discretion about whether or not it wants to use 
negotiated rulemaking, since presumably the decision to use negotiated 
rulemaking or not falls within “agency choice of policymaking form,”37 and 
is therefore immune from judicial review.38  Courts have not treated rules 
promulgated following negotiated rulemaking any differently than rules 
promulgated using other administrative procedures, thereby implying that 
there is also no legal incentive for agencies to use negotiated rulemaking. 
In Safe Buildings Alliance v. EPA,39 for instance, the first case to 
challenge a negotiated rule, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia never once mentioned that the rule had been adopted through 
negotiation.  Two years later, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
EPA,40 the D.C. Circuit again never mentioned that a rule it was reviewing 
had been promulgated using negotiated rulemaking.  The NRA itself clearly 
indicates that judicial review of negotiated rules will be treated the same as 
judicial review of other forms of rules.  Section 570 of the NRA explicitly 
states that negotiated rules should not be “accorded any greater 
deference”41 than other forms of rules.42  So, negotiated rulemaking is 
purely optional and provides agencies few incentives to utilize it. 
In short, in the policy toolkit that has been discussed so far, there have 
been two forms of responses to the current incentives:  One would require 
certain forms of participation, through coercion, and one would authorize 
participation but would make it optional without providing agencies any 
incentive to engage the public.  Democracy index rulemaking, as discussed 
in the rest of this part, relies on a new paradigm.  Agencies should be 
 
 37. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1383 (2004). 
 38. Even in the context of negotiated rulemaking, presumably there would be exceptions 
to this general statement of agency discretion.  For instance, if the agency action was going 
to be particularized as regarding one party, an individual hearing might be required. See 
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908).  But see Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. 
of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (rejecting a similar claim). 
 39. 846 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 40. 907 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 41. 5 U.S.C. § 570. 
 42. Section 570 provides as follows: 
  Any agency action relating to establishing, assisting, or terminating a negotiated 
rulemaking committee under this subchapter shall not be subject to judicial review. 
Nothing in this section shall bar judicial review of a rule if such judicial review is 
otherwise provided by law.  A rule which is the product of negotiated rulemaking 
and is subject to judicial review shall not be accorded any greater deference by a 
court than a rule which is the product of other rulemaking procedures. 
Id. 
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incentivized but not required to involve the public in administrative 
rulemaking.  And, as these later sections discuss, the incentive should be 
more lenient judicial review. 
B.  Two-Tier Process:  An Overview 
The formulation for democracy index rulemaking is simple.  As with the 
current regime regarding negotiated rulemaking, which states that the 
agency has the choice between using the special rulemaking procedure or 
NNC, an agency that has decided to promulgate a legislative rule has to 
decide whether it wants to use one of two procedures.  As an initial matter, 
the agency would have to decide internally which of the two routes for 
rulemaking it wants to follow.  Its decision about what rulemaking form to 
use would be essentially unreviewable, as would seemingly be dictated by 
the logic of the Chenery cases43 interpreting the APA. 
During the first procedure, NNC rulemaking, the agency would follow 
the notice and comment procedures currently specified in the APA.  Using 
the second procedure, DNC rulemaking,44 the agency would be required to 
convene a series of administrative juries and would put its proposed rule 
through a process involving those juries.  These juries would involve a 
combination of stakeholder interests and members of the general public, a 
combination which will be discussed at greater length in the following 
several sections. 
An agency would first present its proposed rule to a meeting of hundreds 
of citizens.  These citizens would then retreat to their own small groups to 
discuss these rules, with the assistance of counsel.45  These various small 
groups would then have to assess the validity of these rules, and compose a 
report based on their assessment.  These assessments would not be binding, 
but the agency would at least have to seriously consider them and, if opting 
to proceed in another direction, discuss why it has chosen to do so.  Such a 
statement of agreement or disagreement would be included as part of the 
 
 43. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v Chenery Corp. 
(Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 84-86 (1943). 
 44. This part of democracy index rulemaking will seem obviously similar to Bruce 
Ackerman and James Fishkin’s idea of “deliberation day.” Bruce Ackerman & James S. 
Fishkin, Deliberation Day (2004).  Ackerman and Fishkin envision a national holiday, 
occurring before each national election, at which time registered voters would meet in their 
communities to discuss the election.  I tend to share Richard Pildes’s feeling that this idea is 
“grandiose . . . a quixotic and highly contrived academic exercise.” Richard H. Pildes, 
Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 Election L.J. 685, 694 (2004); 
see Ackerman & Fishkin, supra, at 13 (calling their proposal “realistic utopianism”).  By 
contrast, democracy index rulemaking seems to be more limited, and hence more realistic. 
 45.  These counsel would presumably be chosen from a specially trained class of agency 
employees.  These employees would have a kind of independence similar to the structural 
independence enjoyed by administrative law judges.  This independence would allow them 
more freely to advise and discuss issues with participants in deliberative notice and comment 
(“DNC”).  However, the fact that they were employees of the agencies, trained by the 
agencies, and so on would mean they would have a sort of cultural affinity for the agency in 
a way that would ensure that these counsel would not overly undermine agency autonomy. 
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general statement that the agency issues, along with its rules, which would 
then go through a shortened notice and comment period. 
The agency that uses DNC will be guaranteed what will be called 
“deliberative deference.”  This form of judicial review, created to entice 
agencies to use participatory schemes of rulemaking, would make it quite 
difficult to obtain pre-enforcement review of a legislative rule, and would 
lead to an extremely deferential standard of review of that rule once it does 
make it into court.  The agency that uses NNC would not be guaranteed 
deliberative deference, but the greater number of relevant and non-repetitive 
comments it receives during NNC, the greater amount of deliberative 
deference the eventual legislative rule would receive.  While the agency that 
uses DNC faces a bright-line test to see if it receives deliberative deference, 
the agency that uses the NNC procedure would be facing a sliding scale of 
deliberative deference in court.  These are the general contours of 
democracy index rulemaking; but what about the specifics? 
C.  Normal Notice and Comment Process 
NNC rulemaking pursuant to democracy index rulemaking would be a 
relatively straightforward process, involving nowhere near the details of 
institutional design necessary to explain DNC.  If the agency decided to use 
NNC, it would proceed as is currently done with notice and comment 
rulemaking.  First, as stated in the APA, “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule 
making shall be published in the Federal Register . . . . The notice shall 
include . . . either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved.”46  The agency would then 
proceed to conduct its NNC procedure. 
Democracy index rulemaking would change matters at the end of the 
process.  After the notice and comment period ends, the agency would 
“incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis 
and purpose.”47  This general statement would have to indicate how the 
agency responded to substantial comments made during NNC rulemaking,48 
and discuss the policy considerations and conclusions regarding major 
issues of fact and policy.49  These requirements are old; however, agencies 
would also now have to include as part of their general statement a 
“democratic participation statement” (“DPS”).  The DPS would indicate the 
number of relevant and non-repetitive comments received during 
rulemaking, and would break down by category and by individual or 
institutional interest who precisely submitted these comments.50 
That is how NNC procedure would differ from current notice and 
comment procedure.  But what about judicial review of NNC, the major 
 
 46. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 47. Id. § 553(c). 
 48. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 49. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 50. Courts would have the capacity to review this statement, pursuant to a very flexible 
standard, to make sure it is truthful. 
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incentive that agencies would face to involve the public in NNC more than 
they do in current notice and comment?  If a legislative rule was challenged 
in court, the court would have to examine the DPS and determine if the 
agency was entitled to special deference.51 
How should the amount of “democracy” during NNC rulemaking be 
measured?  As an initial matter, comments that are not responsive or that 
duplicate other comments would not be counted for purposes of calculating 
the democracy index.  Agencies currently do not have “to discuss every fact 
or opinion contained in the public comments.”52  Only “relevant . . . issues 
raised during” notice and comment need to be addressed,53 and comments 
which are “frivolous or repetitive” need not be addressed.54  Not counting 
these comments for purposes of the democracy index would presumably be 
as unproblematic from the perspective of “arbitrary and capricious”55 or 
equal protection concerns56 as not responding to these comments during 
notice and comment now. 
Beyond that, it would make sense simply to count the sheer number of 
relevant and non-repetitive comments submitted and have this serve as the 
number that a court uses to determine the amount of deference that a 
particular rule would receive.  Such a system would adequately balance 
equality concerns and public choice concerns.  On one hand, counting each 
comment equally (so long as it meets a minimum threshold of relevance 
and does not duplicate other comments) is the logical extension of the “one 
person, one vote” principle extended to the NNC process.57  This regime 
would be relatively “objective”58 and would not involve a court (or an 
agency filing its DPS) ranking certain comments beyond the easier initial 
stage of disqualification. 
On the other hand, counting all comments equally might raise some 
public choice concerns that special interest groups will work with agencies 
to find creative ways to have their allies submit many comments, in order to 
 
 51. This special (deliberative) deference is discussed in greater detail in Part I.E, infra. 
 52. South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 885 (4th Cir. 1983); see also 
Gen. Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 862 (5th Cir. 1971); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. 
v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 484 (D. Kan. 1978), aff’d, 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 53. Block, 717 F.2d at 886; see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 n.58 
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Bergland, 493 F. Supp. 488, 492-93 (D.D.C. 
1980). 
 54. Gen. Tel. Co., 449 F.2d at 862; Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc., 446 F. Supp. at 484. 
 55. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
 56. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
 57. One could make a number of arguments as to why notice and comment “one person, 
one vote” is not as compelling as voting “one person, one vote.”  For one thing, perhaps 
voting is simply more crucial and fundamental than participating in the administrative 
process.  It is clear that one does not have the same right to participate in rulemaking as one 
does to vote in elections, for instance. 
 58. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics:  The Elusive Quest for Judicial 
Review of Political Fairness, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1643, 1648 (1993) (stating that the standard 
was originally adopted because it was easier to handle); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next 
Time:  Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 741 (1998) (stating 
that the one person, one vote standard is the “paradigmatic ‘objective’ rule”). 
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ensure that their desired rule is passed and receives deliberative deference 
by a reviewing court.  By not counting repetitive comments, though, NNC 
makes it much more difficult for there to be agency capture (via many 
submissions of comments) during this process. 
D.  Deliberative Notice and Comment:  The Other Option 
NNC is easy to explain and describe, and therefore easy for agencies to 
administer.  Simply open the agency doors for comments, eliminate 
irrelevant and repetitive comments, and count the rest of the comments.  
The DNC process is more complex.  For many readers, it will bear obvious 
similarities to Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin’s idea in Deliberation 
Day of having a national holiday for citizens to meet in their communities 
and deliberate about presidential and congressional races; these similarities 
are largely superficial and at a very general level.59  True, DNC involves 
citizens deliberating about public affairs just as they would with 
Deliberation Day, but DNC is something less and something more.  Unlike 
Deliberation Day, democracy index rulemaking is not a two-day national 
holiday which would cost hundreds of billions of dollars, thereby making 
democracy index rulemaking realistic and not “realistic utopianism,”60 the 
way Ackerman and Fishkin describe their proposal.  It does not involve the 
major public issues debated in a presidential or congressional race.  It does, 
however, involve citizens making decisions with potential actual legal 
effects, rather than merely debating a hypothetical with no consequences to 
follow.  Other differences in institutional design should be clear as the 
details of DNC are discussed in greater detail. 
If the agency decided not to use the NNC process, it would instead use 
DNC rulemaking, which it would have to announce by publishing a notice 
in the Federal Register.  The agency would be responsible for convening a 
series of juries composed of two discrete types of parties: those clearly 
affected by the proposed rule and general members of the public.  The 
stakeholder participants would be selected in the same manner that is 
currently used to select negotiated rulemaking committees.  As with the 
NRA, a convener would be retained to assist in the process of identifying 
the relevant affected interests.61  The convener would have the authority to 
make contact with potentially affected parties and to solicit participants 
through the Federal Register.62 
Because the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”) has been 
interpreted to apply to negotiated rulemaking, these negotiated rulemaking 
committees must be “fairly balanced”63 in terms of the “points of view 
 
 59. Ackerman & Fishkin, supra note 44. 
 60. Id. at 13. 
 61. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b)(1) (2000). 
 62. Id. § 564(a)(1) (requiring publication in the Federal Register of notice of the 
establishment of a negotiated rulemaking committee to negotiate a proposed rule). 
 63. Id. app. § 5(b)(2), at 3. 
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represented and the functions [that are] performed,”64 and therefore 
stakeholder participants in DNC must conform to FACA as well.  This 
FACA requirement ensures that “persons or groups directly affected by the 
work of a particular advisory committee would have some representation on 
the committee.”65  It is imagined that, as with the current regime regarding 
negotiated rulemaking, it would be quite hard to obtain judicial review of 
the decision to invite certain stakeholders to participate.66 
Members of the general public would be selected using a process similar 
to the process used to select members of juries.  First, as with the selection 
of regular juries, there would be the identification of the relevant “jury 
district.”67  In the case of democracy index rulemaking, the representative 
jury would be selected from the entire country.  The second stage would 
involve the creation of the “source list,” or the list of names and addresses 
of residents available for jury service within this given (national) district.  
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 196868 encourages the use of voter 
registration lists, but this tends to create distributional inequities in the 
eventual composition of the jury.69  The voter registration list would thus be 
combined with a national database of driver registration lists.70  From this 
list of eligible jurors, the agency would select a group of potential small 
group members who meet the minimum requirements specified in the 
second stage. 
Small group members whose names have been located after these first 
two stages would be mailed a questionnaire.  Racial minorities generally 
receive these questionnaires at a lower rate than whites in the case of jury 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Nat’l Anti-hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of the President’s Private Sector 
Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). 
 66. So far, the only courts of appeal to squarely address what constitutes a fair balance 
are the Fifth and D.C. Circuits. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 
1999); Nat’l Anti-hunger Coalition, 711 F.2d at 1074; see also NW Ecosystem Alliance v. 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, at 
*3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 1999).  Courts seem to look at the functions the committee was 
created to perform, and permit a substantial degree of discretion in determining whether the 
composition of the committee is a fair balance. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 
336 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 67. For a helpful discussion of the general rules used to a select a jury, see Hiroshi 
Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury:  Racial Disenfranchisement and the Search for Justice 39-
80 (1993) (giving an overview of the jury selection process). 
 68. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869, 1871 (2000). 
 69. Cf. Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering:  Cancer or Cure?  A Contemporary 
Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 707, 712-13 (1993) 
(“Voter registration lists, the most common source of juror names, consistently 
underrepresent African-American and Hispanic citizens who would otherwise be eligible to 
serve as jurors.” (footnote omitted)). 
 70. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1861; 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 
15.2(a), at 255 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that “both the grand jury and petit jury arrays are 
chosen by a method of random selection from a representative source list (such as a voter 
registration list or a combination of that list and other comprehensive lists)”). 
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selection, because they are more mobile,71 and return these questionnaires 
at a lower rate,72 so special efforts would have to be made to ensure that a 
large number of members of various groups received these questionnaires.  
Rather than the current jury regime, which disqualifies potential jurors 
based on vague standards such as the absence of “natural faculties,”73 under 
DNC someone would only be eliminated from possible jury service if they 
did not meet certain easily satisfied minimum characteristics of 
competence. 
These jurors would then be required to respond to a summons and serve 
during the DNC process.  The classic “voluntary response” problem is 
normally a problem with other deliberative models,74 and that could only be 
avoided if service was made obligatory.  Without this obligatory service, 
then those who participate in DNC would be self-selected, an obviously 
enormous problem for any process that aspires to be representative (and 
representativeness is surely central to the legitimacy of DNC).75  True, 
obliging a citizen to travel to Washington, D.C., (or to another specified site 
away from home) to serve in the DNC process can be inconvenient, 
especially so because DNC debates might not always be about the most 
interesting of issues.  But DNC would not happen with sufficient frequency 
where its attendant inconveniences would affect more than a handful of 
citizens. 
The jurors who eventually do make it to Washington, D.C., to participate 
in this process would be generously compensated.  As it stands now, the 
average American juror is paid less than twenty-five dollars a day for 
service,76 which is below the 2000 poverty threshold by more than ten 
dollars a day.77  Presumably, if possible, these jurors would have to be 
compensated with more money (not to mention travel and other expenses), 
so that they could manage their service on these administrative juries. 
Once an individual is selected to serve as a stakeholder participant or a 
general public participant in DNC, they would be sent an informational 
booklet regarding the rule they will be required to consider.  The agencies 
themselves would prepare a brief document—perhaps no more than ten 
 
 71. Darryl K. Brown, The Means and Ends of Representative Juries, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y 
& L. 445, 456 (1994) (reviewing Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury:  Racial 
Disenfranchisement and the Search for Justice (1993)). 
 72. Fukurai, supra note 67, at 21. 
 73. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 893(a)(2) (West 1985) (detailing qualifications of grand 
jurors, who are selected with criteria similar to trial jurors); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 305/2 
(West 1992); Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-2-302(a)(1) (1994). 
 74. James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation:  New Directions for Democratic 
Reform 81-104 (1991). 
 75. David S. Moore & George P. McCabe, Introduction to the Practice of Statistics 265-
67 (2d ed. 1999). 
 76. Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury Cola:  Fulfilling the Duty to Compensate 
Jurors Adequately, 5 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 289, 340 (2002). 
 77. Currently, the poverty wage threshold amounts to $34.46 per day or $8959 per year 
for a single earner. U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty 2000 (Aug. 22, 2002), 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh00.html (presenting 2000 threshold). 
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pages—summarizing the proposed agency rule and the reasons for that rule.  
To facilitate debate, the agency would randomly select a party (presumably 
an elite institutional one) to prepare a rebuttal, based on who responded to 
the notice in the Federal Register and expressed an interest in constructing 
such a document. 
A short time later, stakeholder participants and the selected members of 
the general public would arrive in Washington, D.C., for their service, and 
at the start of the DNC process they, along with several hundred others (the 
overwhelming majority being general public participants, along with the 
appropriate number of stakeholder participants), would meet in a general 
session.  A representative of the administrative agency would greet the 
participants in a general plenary session and provide them with an oral 
summary of the briefing book they received and the reasons why the agency 
is considering the rule it is proposing. 
At this point, dozens of randomly organized juries would meet separately 
to discuss the proposed agency rules.  Stakeholder participants as well as 
general public participants would be randomly assigned to a deliberative 
small group.  Each deliberative small group would consist of approximately 
fifteen people, with about thirty-five groups meeting at first.  While it 
would be at least conceptually possible for there to be discussions in the 
initial large group meeting, the primary discussions should take place in the 
smaller sessions since, as Robert Dahl has noted, there are “upper limits” to 
effective participation.78  This smaller size is also consistent with the size of 
an analogous institution, the common law grand jury, which was generally 
composed of between twelve and twenty-three jurors.79 
In these deliberative small groups, discussions would be led by an 
Administrative Law Moderator (“ALM”), who would be specially trained 
in discussion moderation.  Like administrative law judges, ALMs could not 
have their work evaluated or sanctioned by an agency short of clear and 
gross misconduct.  The ALM would have a very minor role; he or she 
would merely be the presiding officer, entrusted with enforcing the rule that 
no member of the deliberative small group could talk for more than two 
minutes at a time and could not speak again until every other member of the 
small group had a chance to speak.  In other words, the ALM would be 
entrusted with making sure that no one person could dominate the 
discussion.  Importantly, the ALM would not have the capacity to rule 
certain comments out of order. 
Each DNC small group would have a clear mission:  to provide some sort 
of evaluative report to submit to the agency about the proposed rule.  As the 
discussion in the small group proceeds, an individual who wants to suggest 
an item for inclusion in the small group report can indicate as much.  This 
 
 78. Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution:  Authority in a Good Society 54, 118 (1970); 
Robert A. Dahl & Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy 110-17 (1973) (discussing the 
impact of the size of a democratic system on its ability to tackle its problems). 
 79. State v. Gowan, 214 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. 1973); People v. Infante, 511 
N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); State v. Conger, 878 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Or. 1994). 
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item would then be noted by the ALM, and would be voted on only at the 
end of the process, when the small group could evaluate how that one 
reaction to the agency rule fits with other reactions to the rule. 
At a certain point, members of the deliberating small group will feel that 
they have discussed the proposed rule enough, and that they are ready to 
make their final report.  An individual group member would have the power 
to make a motion to end debate and to begin the process of creating the 
final report.  This motion to end debate would be voted upon—
anonymously—by members of the small group, and would need a simple 
majority in order to pass.  The reason for this is simple:  public voting could 
rupture the sort of goodwill that these small groups need.  The corollary to 
the anonymity of the process is that each vote requires only a simple 
majority, so members of the group do not have the chance to target 
dissenters. 
If this motion passes, and after the small group voted on the various 
reactions it had to the agency rule, a randomly assigned counsel (an 
individual with the same structural protections enjoyed by the 
administrative law judges and ALMs) would join the deliberating small 
group.  The small group counsel would be entrusted with drafting a report 
based on these comments.  By giving this job to the specially trained 
counsel, DNC ensures that the final small group report is sufficiently 
technical to be helpful; by not having the counsel join the group earlier 
DNC ensures that small group participants will not tailor their comments to 
please the counsel.  The counsel would bring this report back to the small 
group, which would have the authority to reject or approve the report and 
indicate what changes should be made, thereby ensuring that even the 
technical report is accountable to the desires of the small group.  This DNC 
small group would cease to exist once it approves, by a simple majority 
vote, a report commenting on the agency rule. 
The agency would evaluate these position papers and suggested reforms, 
and would be obligated to address each relevant and non-repetitive 
comment raised in these reports.80  This might be where the “hard look” 
doctrine of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe81 continues in 
force, because judicial review of agency treatment of these jury statements 
would be “thorough, probing, in-depth review.”82  While some worry that 
hard look review overly interferes with agency autonomy,83 applying hard 
look review to agency treatment of these jury suggestions would not do so.  
Usually, hard look review means that a court must scrutinize some—if not 
 
 80. In the context of negotiated rulemaking, the agency may promulgate a rule loosely 
based on the consensus position adopted by the negotiated rulemaking committee. 5 U.S.C. § 
563(a)(7) (2000); see Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts:  An Update, 46 Duke L.J. 
1445, 1469-71 (1997) (discussing this power). 
 81. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 82. Id. at 415. 
 83. E.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations:  Remands 
Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 599, 632 (2004) (stating that hard 
look review “exacerbates regulatory ossification and distorts regulatory policy”). 
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all—of the record established during the agency decision-making process, 
thus facing the agency with scrutiny related to a substantial number of 
materials and issues.84 
This application of hard look review, though, would require the agency to 
adequately consider the discrete and presumably small number of 
comments and issues raised in the thirty-five jury statements.  It is possible 
that the jury statements might propose alternative suggestions, and the 
agency would be required to address these alternatives or face the 
consequences.85  The final rule that the agency promulgates after the 
deliberations of these juries would then be subject to general notice and 
comment, but because this is a special form of participatory notice and 
comment, the allotted period for notice and comment would be shorter than 
the usual sixty days. 
E.  Deliberative Deference 
As an incentive for agencies to use DNC or to ensure that there are many 
comments during NNC (and as a means of avoiding substantial oversight 
from many sources), democracy index rulemaking would provide 
essentially three general changes to the current treatment of agency rules (in 
addition to the shortened subsequent notice and comment following the 
small group deliberations during DNC):  (i) a relaxation of analytical 
requirements, (ii) a tightening of the standards necessary to secure pre-
enforcement review, and (iii) a loosening of the standard of judicial review 
used by courts to review legislative rules promulgated subsequent to agency 
actions that qualify for deliberative deference.  These three elements can be 
used as helpful inducements because they have all played a powerful role in 
constraining agencies and because they are negotiable (as compared to 
something like standing, which seems to be an outgrowth of changes in 
constitutional rather than statutory law). 
As it stands now, in addition to the foundational requirements in the 
APA, various statutes and executive orders require administrative agencies 
to use certain forms of analytical techniques, and also require agencies to 
submit these analyses to the Office of Management and Budget for 
review.86  The National Environmental Policy Act requires that agencies 
prepare environmental impact statements.87  Agencies must also engage in 
cost-benefit assessments of economically significant rules.88  The 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to describe any rules 
 
 84. Cf. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 85. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); 
Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n (Scenic Hudson II), 453 F.2d 463 
(2d Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n (Scenic Hudson I), 
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 86. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative 
Rulemaking, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 533, 536-37 (2000) (listing requirements). 
 87. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000). 
 88. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 
638-42 (2000). 
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that they expect to have an economic impact on small entities.89  The Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 requires that federal 
agencies go through a special process to allow small businesses and 
governments to comment on certain proposed rules.90  The Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act indicates that agencies should consider regulations 
that impose mandates on specified governmental entities, and should 
prepare certain regulatory analyses related to this consideration.91  Agencies 
must consider the potential that their regulations will effect a “taking” of 
private property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.92  They 
must analyze the “trade” impact of potential regulations,93 and must also 
consider the impact of their regulations on “federalism,”94 as well as on 
“families.”95 
If an agency uses DNC, then it would automatically be freed from the 
obligation to perform these types of analyses.  This is because the 
heightened democratic process that permitted the agency to receive 
deliberative deference would serve as a universal proxy for these analytical 
requirements.  It would ensure that the relevant cross section of interests 
were considered, and if there was a sense that special considerations should 
be examined in the case of one particular rule, an agency would have the 
capacity to highlight this concern when proposing the rule. 
If the agency uses NNC, it would not automatically be freed from the 
obligations imposed by these analytical requirements.  Instead, the greater 
the number of comments received, the less rigorous analytical statements 
the agency would need to file.  Sometimes, of course, this may mean that, 
like with DNC, the agency need not file any analytical statements at all; on 
other occasions, it may need to file the currently required statements. 
Second of all, the standards for obtaining pre-enforcement review of 
agency action would be altered.  As it stands now, the requirements for 
obtaining pre-enforcement review were spelled out in Abbott Laboratories 
v. Gardner.96  The Court decided that the two central questions that must be 
answered in order to determine if pre-enforcement review is available are 
 
 89. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2000). 
 90. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2000). 
 91. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1538, 1571 (2000). 
 92. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 
636-37 (2000). 
 93. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), repealed by Exec. Order 12,866, 3 
C.F.R. 638, 649 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 642 (2000). 
 94. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987), repealed by Exec. Order 12,132, 3 
C.F.R. 206, 211, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 646 (2000). 
 95. Id. 
 96. 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see also Richard Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 89 (1995).  Pierce has argued that two recent Supreme 
Court cases, Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993), and Thunder Basin 
Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994), seem to indicate a retreat from Abbott Laboratories. 
See Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.14, at 185-
88 (3d ed. supp. 1995). 
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whether the situation is such that a court could competently handle pre-
enforcement review,97 and whether delaying judicial review would create 
an undue burden on the parties.98  As a practical matter, these extremely 
loose standards have been applied with almost uniform results:  Pre-
enforcement review is almost always permitted.99  This has attracted the 
wrath of a variety of critics.100 
This system would be changed so that an agency following DNC would 
not have its legislative rule subject to pre-enforcement review, absent some 
sort of claim of dramatic procedural irregularity.101  If the agency used 
NNC, then as part of the general balancing that occurs using the two factors 
pursuant to Abbott Laboratories,102 a court contemplating pre-enforcement 
review would add the degree of participation in the agency process to its list 
of considerations.103 
Finally, the relevant standard of review used by courts to evaluate 
legislative rules would be altered.  As it stands right now, reviewing courts 
may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.”104  It might be that the “hard look” version of 
this standard is still in effect, so that a court must make sure that “the 
agency has taken a hard look at the issues with the use of reasons and 
standards.”105  No matter what the empirical evidence seems to 
demonstrate, this standard of review has been easy in theory, yet frequently 
strict in fact. 
Christopher Schroeder and Robert Glicksman, for instance, studied 
judicial review of a select group of Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) actions from 1991 to 1999.106  In the cases where the EPA action 
was challenged as arbitrary and capricious, the agency was reversed twenty-
 
 97. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Admin. Conference of the U.S., 1982 Report 60-64 (1982) (Recommendation 82-7) 
[hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 82-7]. 
 100.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking:  An 
Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, Law & Contemp. Probs., 
Spring 1994, at 185, 233-38. 
 101. Cf. ACUS Recommendation 82-7, supra note 99, at 60-64 (suggesting similar 
exception to proposed general ban on pre-enforcement review). 
 102. See also Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149 (“The problem is best seen in a twofold 
aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”). 
 103. The less pre-enforcement review available, the greater chance that regulated 
industries must participate (by definition), meaning that they could both be more aware of 
whether the rule will eventually be invalidated (thereby possibly leading them to invest less 
in compliance) and the less they have to complain about since they assisted in the 
promulgation of the rule. 
 104. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
 105. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 106. Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in 
the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,371 (2001). 
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two percent of the time.107  Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott’s study of the 
aftermath of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council108 
shows that agencies are reversed in general half of the time, even if not 
always for reasons related to the arbitrary and capricious standard.109 
Pursuant to the new standard, agencies using DNC would have their 
legislative rules overturned only if there was some sort of sign of a clear 
and manifest error.110  Agencies using NNC would face a sliding scale of 
deference, from full-scale hard look review if the agency acted after only 
minimal participation to the clear and manifest error standard if the agency 
acted after substantial participation in NNC.  Adjusting the standard of 
review, of course, would not alter the nature of things to be reviewed.  A 
reviewing court would still look to see if the agency was perhaps required 
to give a formal hearing.111  The reviewing court would have to ensure that 
the facts that the agency presented, at some level, support the rules that the 
agency promulgated.112  The reviewing court would have to ensure that the 
agency acted within its permissible boundaries set by Congress.  All of 
these considerations, though, would be reviewed with a strong presumption 
that the agency was correct. 
II.  VIRTUES OF DEMOCRACY INDEX RULEMAKING 
Assessing democracy index rulemaking is problematic at some level, of 
course, because we do not know the precise system that would result.  
Democracy index rulemaking calls for a floating standard of judicial 
review.  If the agency uses DNC rulemaking, for instance, then it would 
face very minimal judicial review, and one presumably could group the 
agency process into one that involves “political . . . controls over 
administrative action,”113 depending on whether one defines popular 
control to be a form of political control.  If the agency uses NNC, and does 
not receive many comments, then its rules will be scrutinized more closely 
by courts, so it would be an instance of “judicial . . . controls over 
 
 107. Id. at 10,392. 
 108. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 109. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station:  An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984, 1022.  Note that Schuck and Elliott, in 
counting up reversals of agency decisions, counted any case involving any reason why the 
agency was reversed. Id. at 1008 (stating that they were counting cases where the agency 
“was reversed or remanded on any ground”). 
 110. It is hard to think of any other verbal formulation that indicates a more relaxed 
standard of review than “arbitrary and capricious.” 
 111. E.g., United States v. Fla. East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (stating that 
requirement regarding “hearing” as part of a rulemaking did not require formal procedures, 
either directly or by triggering the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements); Auto. 
Parts & Accessories Ass’n v Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 112. E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 29 
(1983); Nat’l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass’n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Boyd, 407 F.2d at 342. 
 113. Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park:  Political and Judicial Controls over 
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1251, 1252-53 (1992). 
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administrative action.”114  No matter what, though, participation would 
seemingly be more common, a result achieved by striking a constructive 
balance between feeding agencies more information and providing them 
with greater legitimacy, yet allowing them to exercise effective power and 
control over the functions they have been established to pursue. 
A.  The Benefits of Democracy Index Rulemaking 
1.  Administrative Legitimacy 
In his landmark Crisis and Legitimacy,115 James Freedman argued that 
the history of the administrative state is one involving the perpetual crisis of 
the absence of administrative legitimacy, with the administrative state being 
the “manifestation of a deeper uneasiness over the place and function of the 
administrative process in American government.”116  Even though “each 
generation has fashioned solutions responsive to the problems it has 
perceived, the nation’s sense of uneasiness with the administrative process 
has persisted.”117  Administrative law seems to be the rare field in 
American law that still must go to great lengths to justify its very 
existence.118 
Democracy index rulemaking might be a partial solution for this 
perpetual crisis, because it provides for a floating standard of review.  
Surely part of the problem, which attempts to provide a unifying theory of 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy:  The Administrative Process and 
American Government (1978). 
 116. Id. at 9. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Administrative law still remains unique in this way.  For instance, we generally do 
not discuss the legitimacy of the very existence of constitutional law.  Even those who call 
for the abolition of strong constitutional review by courts do not argue that we should do 
away with constitutional law altogether. E.g., Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away 
from the Courts (1999).  Likewise, we may argue that there should be fewer criminal laws, 
or more justly enforced criminal laws, but no one is really arguing that we should do away 
with criminal law.  By contrast, even now, many of the arguments about administrative law 
seem to question the very legitimacy of the administrative state.  There are two versions of 
this:  One version that realizes that the administrative state is here to stay, so instead looks to 
something like the non-delegation doctrine as a second-best solution, e.g., David 
Schoenrbod, Power Without Responsibility:  How Congress Abuses the People Through 
Allegation (1993), and to the new non-delegation doctrine as perhaps a third-best solution. 
E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. 
E.P.A., 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the 
Millennium:  A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399 (2000); 
Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713 (1969) (calling 
for general arbitrariness review). But see Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise 
of the “New” Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2000).  Another version 
seems really to question the very legitimacy of any administrative state, no matter how small 
such a state may be. E.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 
Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“The post-New Deal administrative state is 
unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a 
bloodless constitutional revolution.”). 
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administrative legitimacy, is that legitimacy will come from different 
sources in different situations.  Sometimes, perhaps, legitimacy should 
come from agency technical expertise; sometimes, from popular 
participation.  For some reason, though, no one seems to refer to the idea of 
a floating standard of review—and hence a changing theory of legitimacy—
when it comes to agency rulemaking.  Democracy index rulemaking 
changes this because legitimacy comes in different shapes on different 
occasions.  On the occasion when the agency does not want to involve the 
public, its decisions will be legitimated because of the internal expertise it 
applies and the legal scrutiny applied by courts.  On the occasion when the 
agency wants a great degree of public participation, its action will be 
legitimated by the scrutiny of the public. 
Democracy index rulemaking might also help with legitimacy gaps in 
administrative law because it references a sort of idealized process as the 
source of legitimacy, rather than the less normatively appealing process that 
might result from the usual (public choice perhaps) story of everyday 
politics.  Someone who believes in the unitary executive idea of 
administrative legitimacy,119 for instance, contemplates a form of political 
legitimacy, but one that inevitably is mired in the realities of the politics of 
the executive branch, where powerful groups dominate lobbying of the 
executive branch. 
By contrast, Richard Stewart’s interest representation approach is one 
theory of administrative legitimacy that appeals to an idealized political 
process as a source of legitimacy.120  This interest representation approach 
required an agency to “consider all of the relevant interests affected,”121 
potentially even including “persons and groups not represented as 
parties.”122  In other words, legitimacy stemmed not from the groups that 
actually influenced the agency, but the groups that, at some normative level, 
are the “affected interests” that should be considered. 
Despite the appeals of this sort of idealized process form of legitimacy, 
interest representation participation is painfully imprecise.  It involves 
 
 119. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the 
First Half-Century, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1451, 1453-55 (1997). 
 120. It should be made clear that Stewart did not favor this approach; he just described its 
emergence. Cf. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:  
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 
Geo. L.J. 1625, 1633 (1986) (“[Stewart] concluded that all of the obvious possibilities for 
application within traditional procedural frameworks were seriously flawed.”).  Stewart also 
considered more clearly political mechanisms for interest representations. Stewart, supra 
note 7, at 1790.  He discussed holding popular elections for agency members, or private 
organizations that have been designated by Congress appointing them. Id.  He disliked both 
options. Id. at 1791.  The problems with this system would be obvious:  Voter disinterest 
plus interest group interest would pose massive public choice problems. 
 121. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1757. 
 122. Id. at 1758 n.422 ( “[The Commission’s] role does not permit it to act as an umpire 
blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public 
must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission.” (quoting 
Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
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agencies—and courts reviewing the actions of agencies—deliberating and 
guessing ex post about which institutions or representatives could best 
actualize the desires of others.  How is a court, for instance, supposed to be 
able to know with any sort of precision which interests should be 
represented in a proceeding regulating the proper level of a toxin?  The 
world of potentially affected interests is massive, and courts seem 
particularly ill equipped to determine who should gain a seat at the table. 
By contrast, democracy index rulemaking appeals to an idealized 
political process as a source of legitimacy, but it does not run into the same 
sort of issues of imprecision involved in interest representation approaches.  
Rather than an ill equipped court trying to guess, ex post, which interests 
would be affected, agencies are entrusted with the obligation of identifying 
affected interests and bringing them to the table.  Moreover, agencies 
supervise a sort of normatively preferable political process, one involving a 
representative set of citizens, rather than the forms of process involved in 
real political process (elite politicians being influenced by elite interests) or 
the interest representation process (imprecisely selected elite representatives 
of only affected interests). 
In addition, to the extent that democracy index rulemaking encourages a 
form of citizen participation (without incurring substantial additional costs, 
as discussed later), it might generally legitimate the administrative state 
because “[d]eliberative democracy legitimates the collective judgment 
resulting from deliberative procedures”123 and democracy index rulemaking 
would prioritize discussion and make deliberative rulemaking a more 
common occurrence.  Bernard Manin has argued that deliberative decisions 
are legitimate “because they are, in the last analysis, the outcome of the 
deliberative process taking place before . . . the citizens.”124  Citizen 
participation via democracy index rulemaking can also be a means of 
continually aligning administrative law with community norms: 
[T]he jury imports its values into the law not so much by open 
revolt in the teeth of the law and the facts, although in a minority of 
cases it does do this, as by what we termed the liberation 
hypothesis.  The jury, in the guise of resolving doubts about the 
issues of fact, gives reign to its sense of values.  It will not often be 
doing this consciously; as the equities of the case press, the jury 
may, as one judge put it, “hunt for doubts.”  Its war with the law is 
thus both modest and subtle.  The upshot is that when the jury 
reaches a different conclusion from the judge on the same 
evidence, it does so not because it is a sloppy or inaccurate finder 
 
 123. Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy, in Democratic Community:  Nomos 
XXXV, at 126, 148 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993); see also David M. 
Estlund, Who’s Afraid of Deliberative Democracy?  On the Strategic/Deliberative 
Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1437, 1469 (1993) (“A 
decision is made legitimate by being chosen in an actual deliberative democratic procedure 
that tends—though imperfectly—to produce substantially just decisions.”). 
 124. Bernand Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 Pol. Theory 338, 359 
(1987). 
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of facts, but because it gives recognition to values which fall 
outside the official rules.125 
Moreover, as Jerry Mashaw’s research on Social Security decisions has 
shown, participation in administrative decisions results in “an 
understanding on the claimant’s part of the substantive adjudicatory norms 
and of the decision process.”126  In the context of the criminal jury, a study 
of jurors in Dallas County, Texas, found that they felt much better about the 
fairness of the criminal justice system after their jury service.127  In the 
context of deliberative political experiments, all of the numbers seem to 
suggest that citizens tend to respect governmental process more after they 
participate in it.128 
This might also apply to democracy index rulemaking, even though the 
agency has no legal obligation to abide by the suggestions of their 
respective small groups, because the agency would at least have to provide 
a strong reason why it decided to ignore such suggestions.  Indeed, although 
it is much debated,129 this sort of participation in discussing a rule with an 
agency might eventually decrease the frequency of litigation against the 
 
 125. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 495 (1966); Michael J. Saks, 
Blaming the Jury, 75 Geo. L.J. 693, 704 (1986) (stating that the jury “allows the law to track 
change in society with an efficiency that cannot be achieved by asking legislatures to rewrite 
laws every few months, or even by judges, who are inclined to give more deference to the 
legislature than perhaps they always should,” and that “[t]he jury helps bring about the 
gradual change that the law needs, and prevents upheavals against judicial and legislative 
authority”). 
 126. Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice:  Managing Social Security Disability Claims 
140 (1983) (“Participation . . . inspires confidence that sufficient efforts . . . have been made 
to inform the decisionmaker about the case.”); see also Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation 
in Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 361 (1972) (“If agency hearings were to 
become readily available to public participation, confidence in the performance of 
government institutions and in the fairness of administrative hearings might be measurably 
enhanced.”). 
 127. Daniel W. Shuman & Jean A. Hamilton, Jury Service—It May Change Your Mind:  
Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 SMU L. Rev. 449, 463 (1992). 
 128. See Mark Button & Kevin Mattson, Deliberative Democracy in Practice:  
Challenges and Prospects for Civic Deliberation, 31 Polity 609, 633 (1999). 
 129. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking:  A 
Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 386, 416 (2001).  Coglianese states that: 
[U]ntil I undertook my research, no one had sought to assess these claims by 
collecting comprehensive data on court filings for negotiated and conventional 
rules.  Having collected this data for the [Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”)], I find that six out of the twelve completed EPA negotiated rules in my 
study have resulted in legal challenges, a litigation rate higher than that for all 
significant rules under EPA’s major statutes and almost twice as high as that for 
EPA rules generally. 
Id. But see Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors:  The Actual Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 32, 52 (2000).  Harter writes: 
Coglianese argues throughout his article that the advocates of negotiated rules 
believed that the primary benefits of reg-neg are the reduction in both the time to 
reach a final rule and the incidence of litigation.  While both benefits have been 
realized, neither was perceived by those who established the process as the 
predominant factor motivating its use. 
Id. 
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agency, as has been asserted as a virtue of negotiated rulemaking.130  It may 
also increase the likelihood of paticipating citizens to “vote in subsequent 
elections”131 and remain “more civically active long after the jury process 
has ended.”132  If the agency decided to use NNC, and if many comments 
were received, then many of the same benefits would follow.  Although 
participating institutions or individuals might not feel the same as if they 
had been more directly involved, as is the case with DNC, surely they 
would still feel a greater sense of empowerment and hence a greater sense 
that the administrative action was legitimate. 
If an agency uses DNC, it is possible that the stakeholders selected to 
participate might resent the process and might respect agencies and agency 
process less.  They might resent being forced to mingle, via the small group 
sessions, with average citizens, and might resent their perceived loss of 
influence over agency rule.  This is particularly so since it has been only 
fifteen short years since stakeholders were given the special authority to 
directly negotiate rules with agencies via the NRA.  This, however, might 
be an acceptable price to pay from a broader administrative law perspective 
because by forcing stakeholders to discuss administrative rules with the 
general public they might be sensitized to how the public feels about these 
issues, and might act in a more accountable manner in the future. 
Over the long term, stakeholders will surely notice that they still retain 
significant influence.  A randomly selected stakeholder will be empowered 
to file the report competing with the agency report that small group 
participants receive.  During the small group sessions, stakeholder 
participants will likely be able to make more informed comments about the 
agency rule than members of the general public, and so their comments are 
likely to have greater influence than the comments of other small group 
members.  Before and after the DNC process, stakeholders will have the 
capacity to influence agency rules; they can file additional comments in the 
regular section 553 process that follows DNC, when members of the 
general public are surely less likely to do so. 
This potential increased legitimacy would also be true across a greater 
geographical cross section of interests than might otherwise be true in 
 
 130. E.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 561 note at 617 (2000) 
(“Negotiated rulemaking can increase the acceptability and improve the substance of rules, 
making it less likely that the affected parties will resist enforcement or challenge such rules 
in court.”); Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confrontation or Negotiation?, Harv. Bus. Rev., 
May-June 1981, at 86, 91-92 (noting a substantial increase in the number of regulatory 
lawyers in Washington, D.C., and advocating regulatory negotiation as a solution to the 
“fruitless confrontation” and “protracted regulatory battles” perpetuated by lawyers); Peter 
H. Schuck, Litigation, Bargaining, and Regulation, Regulation, July-Aug. 1979, at 26 
(suggesting negotiation as a means of avoiding the “chronic fractiousness” of policymaking 
in the United States); see also Harter, supra note 9, at 18 n.96 (citing early work 
complaining of adversarial relationships between business and government). 
 131. John Gastil, Is Face-to-Face Citizen Deliberation a Luxury or a Necessity?, 17 Pol. 
Comm’n 357, 359 (2000). 
 132. Graham Smith & Corinne Wales, Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy, 48 
Pol. Stud. 51, 60 (2000). 
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administrative process because DNC would involve citizens from across the 
country.  Currently, some administrative regimes use a program of 
cooperative federalism: 
Cooperative federalism programs set forth some uniform federal 
standards—as embodied in the statute, federal agency regulations, or 
both—but leave state agencies with discretion to implement the federal 
law, supplement it with more stringent standards, and, in some cases, 
receive an exemption from federal requirements.  This power allows 
states to experiment with different approaches and tailor federal law to 
local conditions.133 
Here, though, citizens from across the country pursuant to a process of 
DNC would be participating in a system of administrative governance.  
Since federal administrative action occurs in the name of the federal 
government, it would be a good idea to have a system of legitimation 
involving national concerns. 
2.  Administrative Substance 
In addition to the assistance with the possible legitimacy deficit in 
administrative law, democracy index rulemaking would provide a number 
of additional benefits.  For one thing, it would provide a form of oversight 
of administrative action.  Oversight is central to the administrative law 
project, and so many of the central aspects of the administrative law 
dialogue focus on forms of legislative oversight, executive oversight, and 
judicial oversight.134  But all of these forms of institutional oversight face 
the normal problems of government; institutions have scarce resources and 
tend to be reactive rather than proactive in supervising administrative 
actions,135 and may run into their own sorts of coordination problems.136  
The United States Supreme Court has long argued that the oversight 
rationale is part of the reason for the existence of criminal and civil 
 
 133. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the 
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692, 1697 (2001). 
 134. E.g., Jerry L. Mashaw et al., Administrative Law:  The American Public Law 
System (4th ed. 1998) (dividing the chapters of their introductory administrative law 
casebook into a chapter on the “Legislative Connection,” a chapter on “Executive 
Supervision of Administrative Action,” and chapters on “Suits to Review Administrative 
Action,” “Damage Actions Against the Federal Government and its Officers,” and 
“Beneficiary Enforcement of Public Law”). 
 135. Cf. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:  
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 433 
(1989). 
 136. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory 
Policy, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1994) (arguing that increased political oversight over 
the last twelve years, resulting from infighting between the legislative and executive 
branches, has reduced the discretion of administrative agencies without more democracy or 
better regulatory policy). 
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juries,137 so the increased possibility of DNC can be justified using this 
rationale. 
Agencies using the DNC process, for instance, will have to deal with the 
sentiments of elite groups as well as average citizens, and any misbehavior 
on the part of agencies has a greater chance of being noticed by elite groups 
(and their greater capacity to publicize this misbehavior), as well as by 
average citizens.  Agencies using NNC and receiving a significant amount 
of deliberative deference will be forced to engage and respond to massive 
amounts of public commentary, thereby functioning as a check.  All of this 
occurs, of course, without overly antagonizing agency officials because 
they still have the choice to largely avoid public participation, in which case 
they may be forced to accept the sort of oversight that goes with negative 
reactions to avoiding public involvement. 
Public participation via democracy index rulemaking may also be a 
means of decreasing the chance that interest groups will receive monopoly 
rents from the administrative process.  As James Madison noted in 
Federalist No. 10, factions may be in the position to extract special goods 
from the government, goods that a majority of citizens do not necessarily 
want distributed to these interest groups.138  One response to agency capture 
was the flourishing of the interest representation model and its use of 
techniques such as expanded concepts of standing to permit many parties to 
challenge administrative action.  It used to be that only directly regulated 
parties could challenge an administrative action;139 pursuant to the interest 
 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) (discussing how the 
criminal jury serves “as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the 
Executive Branch”); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) 
(noting the jury’s “overriding responsibility . . . to stand between the accused and a 
potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that is in command of the criminal sanction”); 
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (indicating that “the purpose of the jury trial in 
criminal cases [is] to prevent government oppression, and, in criminal and civil cases, to 
assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues”) (citation omitted); Patton v. United 
States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930) (stating that the criminal jury has historically assisted 
defendants in guarding “against the oppressive power of the King and the arbitrary or partial 
judgment of the court”); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale 
L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991) (“Spanning both civil and criminal proceedings, the key role of the 
jury was to protect ordinary individuals against governmental overreaching.”). 
 138. See The Federalist No. 10, at 46-47 (James Madison) (Colonial Press ed., 1901); see 
also Stewart, supra note 7, at 1684-87. 
 139. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478 (1938) (deciding that only 
those who have suffered a “legal injury” have standing to sue); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 
1243, 1251 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding tenants not entitled to individual review of Federal 
Housing Administrative decisions to grant rent increases).  Former Federal Trade 
Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones, for instance, once stated the following: 
  At the moment under the Commission’s law enforcement obligations, it is 
compelled by due process to listen and take account of the viewpoints of those 
industries and persons which are subject to its regulations.  No such compulsion 
exists for the Commission to listen and take account of the viewpoints of other 
members of the public who may be injured by the Commission’s failure to act or 
by ineffective action in its part. 
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representation model, though, the Supreme Court made it easier for other 
parties to challenge these actions.140 
This sort of change, perhaps created with anti-capture motivations, 
creates a new form of capture, permitting elite interest groups to dominate 
the administrative process, and also significantly interferes with agency 
action by giving some interest groups a veto power over administrative 
action.  By contrast, democracy index rulemaking would encourage 
agencies to use techniques that would permit a cross section of citizens to 
participate in the agency process (using DNC), and if the agency decided to 
ignore their wishes, it would have to give a good reason for doing so.  The 
DNC procedure might also have the effect of limiting the capacity of elite 
groups to pursue rent-seeking policies, because they would be sensitized to 
the interests of a cross section of citizens if the agency decided to use DNC. 
Democracy index rulemaking also makes sense as a simple matter of 
instrumental rationality.  By encouraging participation to the fullest extent 
possible yet still desirable, democracy index rulemaking would create 
incentives for agencies to take actions that would enable them to learn about 
the preferences of affected citizens and groups and the possible outcomes of 
policies, thereby presumably leading to better decisions.141  If one believes 
that an agency is pursuing an objectively “correct” result, then participation 
would increase the chance that an agency would reach this result.142  This is 
particularly so because the types of information that the agency would be 
more likely to receive via democracy index rulemaking might be 
information that it would not obtain otherwise.  The perceptions of risk, for 
instance, that citizens and interest groups have may be different than that of 
the agency.143  The kinds of information that the agency might receive via 
DNC would reflect the considered judgments of citizens, the kinds of 
judgments that citizens would hold after thinking through the regulation 
over a period of time, as they would once the regulation became effective 
and changed their lives. 
 
Observations by Outgoing FTC Member Mary Gardiner Jones on the Outlook for the 
Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 17, 1973), in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 636, 
at D-3 (Oct. 30, 1973). 
 140. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see 
also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973). 
 141. Cf. Felix Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government 132-33 (Beacon Paperback 
ed., 1964) (1930) (“[T]he people must educate their rulers.  At least they must see to it that 
rulers are educated for the tasks of government.”). 
 142. Mashaw, supra note 126, at 202-03. 
 143. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 88 (1995) (arguing that risk managers should not only be attentive to the 
number of lives saved, but also “to public judgments about the contexts in which risks are 
incurred, and hence to the full range of factors that make risks tolerable or intolerable”). 
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B.  De-ossification with Accountability 
Democracy index rulemaking may be normatively desirable because it 
increases the chances of having public participation in administrative 
rulemaking, and of having a particular type of participation.  Increased 
public participation would be constructive, and democracy index 
rulemaking would achieve this increased participation without significantly 
sacrificing agency autonomy (as discussed in greater detail later).  But 
while incentives for public participation might be a good way of structuring 
this regime, why make the reward relaxed judicial review, as opposed to 
some other conceivable reward (perhaps greater funding from Congress, for 
instance)?  On one hand, of course, there is no reason to argue against these 
other potential rewards, because this Essay is just arguing in favor of one 
kind of reward and not against others.  There are real reasons, though, to 
value relaxed judicial review (even via a floating standard) as a particularly 
compelling reward because many have argued that ossification has been in 
large part due to courts, so giving agencies a means of avoiding difficult 
judicial review would presumably be a carrot of great interest to them. 
For many years now, administrative law scholars have complained that 
the agency rulemaking process has become ossified.144  The sources of this 
ossification are plentiful.  As discussed earlier, there have been a series of 
analytical requirements placed on the rulemaking process making the 
process more expensive and therefore less productive.  Executive 
supervision also significantly contributes to ossification, due to the 
increased power of the OMB.145 
Despite the analytical requirements discussed earlier, and the OMB and 
other executive restraints discussed above, most identify generally rigorous 
judicial review as a primary cause of ossification.146  Agencies are now 
more likely to be required to offer detailed explanations for any action they 
 
 144. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture:  The 
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Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 65 (1995). 
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take.147  It used to be that the “concise general statement of basis and 
purpose” that agencies had to create was just that.  For instance, when this 
concise general statement was created for the primary and secondary 
ambient air quality standards created pursuant to the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970, it occupied a single page in the Federal Register.148  
The preamble to the 1987 version of a single standard occupied thirty-six 
pages.149  Such explanations must generally address all factors that the 
agency considered,150 and must address alternative measures.151  If the 
agency has decided to disregard its previous actions, it must justify this 
deviation.152 
Many empirical studies support the idea that courts have played a major 
role in creating the ossification problem.  In 1990, Jerry Mashaw and David 
Harfst published their notable study of rulemaking at the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), and found that the experience of 
that agency supported the idea that courts were behind many of the 
problems that agencies faced.153  In 1966, Congress required that NHTSA 
create rules that improved the safety of automobile passengers.154  In 1971, 
the Sixth Circuit reversed that rule,155 identifying a rather obscure basis for 
its reversal.156  Because of this reversal, it took NHTSA seven years to 
create a new rule that it felt would survive judicial review.157  The Mashaw 
and Harfst conclusion about the consequences of judicial review on agency 
authority has been supported by many “policy-effect” studies that have 
examined the EPA,158 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”),159 the FTC,160 and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
 
 147. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 
800, 807 (1973); Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 
1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 148. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (Apr. 30, 1971). 
 149. Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 52 
Fed. Reg. 24,634 (July 1, 1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
 150. E.g., Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1994); Md. People’s Counsel 
v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 151. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 1993); Int’l 
Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 152. E.g., Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. at 808; Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United 
States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1385 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 153. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1990). 
 154. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, § 103, 80 Stat. 718, 719 
(repealed 1994). 
 155. Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972). 
 156. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 153, at 282-83. 
 157. Id. at 295. 
 158. R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts:  The Case of the Clean Air Act 344 
(1983) (“Court action has encouraged legislators and (EPA) administrators to establish goals 
without considering how they can be achieved . . . . The policymaking system of which the 
federal courts are now an integral part has produced serious inefficiency and inequities, has 
made rational debate and conscious political choice difficult, and has added to frustration 
and cynicism among participants of all stripes.”). 
 159. John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation:  How 
Overregulation Causes Underregulation at OSHA 121 (1988) (“[Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (“OSHA”)] leaders [had to] hesitate about issuing standards for the 
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Commission.161  No matter what the cause, the consequences are clear:  
rulemaking is taking longer and longer to complete and fewer and fewer 
rules are being promulgated.162  Notice and comment rulemaking now takes 
at least five years and tens of thousands of staff hours to complete,163 and 
there is at least a fifty percent chance that rules that result from this process 
will be rejected in some court on some ground.164 
Democracy index rulemaking might ease the burden that courts place on 
agencies, because it would increase the number of instances where they 
would face more relaxed judicial review, thereby taking care of the 
ossification problem at some level (the main annoyance for agencies, and 
therefore probably the main incentive they would respond to) while also 
encouraging participation.  But it would also resolve ossification issues 
without losing focus on the various reasons why ossification has come to 
exist in the first place:  accountability concerns.165  In the context of the 
analytical demands placed on agency rulemaking, this accountability 
concern is directed at certain preferred substantive ends.  Executive control 
over the administrative process provides a sort of political check on 
agencies, and judicial control ensures that agencies stay within substantive 
boundaries and show due respect for certain procedures.166  The question, 
 
same reason that graduate students postpone taking their comprehensive exams:  They aren’t 
sure that they will pass.”); see also Elinor P. Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to 
Occupational Disease:  The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 Geo. L.J. 
1231 (1984); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA:  Regulatory 
Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (1989). 
 160. Barry Boyer, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection Policy:  A 
Postmortem Examination, in Making Regulatory Policy 93, 102 (Keith Hawkins & John 
Thomas eds., 1989) (arguing that “the courts reviewing trade regulation rules not only failed 
to create a strong incentive for high-quality data and analysis; in some respects, they seemed 
to reward poor empirical analysis”). 
 161. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules:  
How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 Admin. L. 
Rev. 7 (1991). 
 162. Carnegie Comm’n, Risk and the Environment:  Improving Regulatory Decision 
Making 108 (1993) (“It is not surprising that the EPA claims that informal rulemaking 
procedures take approximately five years to complete, that the FTC has completed only a 
handful of rulemaking procedures in the past decade or two.”). 
 163. See generally McGarity, supra note 144; Paul Verkuil, Comment: Rulemaking 
Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 453 (1995). 
 164. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 109, at 1022. 
 165. McGarity, supra note 144, at 530 (generally downplaying accountability concerns 
and calling for trusting agencies); Pierce, supra note 161, at 22-27 (same). 
 166. As an example of the accountability goals promoted by judicial review, consider the 
arguments made by Pierce about the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). See 
Pierce, supra note 161.  The hard look review used by courts stimulated a deeper analysis of 
the costs of transition to a market-based system, making the activities of FERC more in line 
with the ways in which Congress wanted FERC to reform energy markets. See Jim Rossi, 
Redeeming Judicial Review:  The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to 
Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 763, 764-65; cf. Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 824j(d)(1)(C) (2000). But see Pierce, supra 
note 161, at 18-22 (criticizing this approach).  The difficulty that FERC had in convincing 
courts that it had sufficiently accounted for transaction costs in deregulating natural gas 
made FERC consider the possibility of making reforms incrementally via the process of 
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then, is how to balance these accountability concerns with a concern that 
agencies are no longer able to pursue effective regulatory agendas.  
Democracy index rulemaking might help adequately balance these 
concerns. 
For instance, removing the analytical requirements that current law 
places on agency actions would clearly ease the burden on agencies and 
allow them to pursue their regulatory agendas with greater vigor.  
Democracy index rulemaking would allow agencies to decide for 
themselves what sort of analytical interests to take account of in the 
process, rather than facing the current system whereby they both have to 
abide by the analytical requirements and face potentially stringent judicial 
review.  Agencies could use a fairly comprehensive analytical process, as 
they do now, and face minimal judicial review, or they could use a thinner 
analytical process, and face more rigorous judicial review. 
As a result of the requirements that agencies face, they have increasingly 
turned to other forms of making policy.167  This is unfortunate because 
rules are in many instances preferable to other forms of agency policy 
making.  Parties are more likely to comply with rules in the absence of 
specific enforcement actions.  Rules are prospective, clearly identifiable, 
and generally clearer in their expectations.  As the administrative state has 
continued to develop, rules have become more important as adjudication-
based agencies (such as the ICC and FTC)168 become less common and 
other agencies, that seemed to be more natural rulemaking agencies (EPA 
or OSHA), become more common, even as those agencies that may have 
been more suited to performing adjudications (Social Security 
Administration) started using rules as a means of agency governance.169  
Democracy index rulemaking would give agencies incentives to again use 
 
approvals of mergers. Energy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234 (1992), rev’d on other 
grounds, Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994).   Even 
Mashaw and Harfst, despite their findings about the effects of judicial review, did not 
believe that courts should substantially abandon judicial review of agency action. Mashaw & 
Harfst, supra note 153, at 225-28.  Rather, they believed in changing the timing of judicial 
review. Id. at 245-47; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency 
Rulemaking:  An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, Law & Contemp. 
Probs., Spring 1994, at 185, 233-38 (making the same argument). 
 167. See Carnegie Comm’n, supra note 162, at 106-07 (stating that “many agencies today 
tend to skirt the informal rulemaking process, turning far more frequently than in the past to 
methods for promulgating policies that are even less formal,” and that “[a]n agency can 
make policy . . . in providing the reasons for its decision in an individual case . . . [or] in 
informal opinions, operating manuals, or even press releases”); Pierce, supra note 96, at 82 
(“All agencies rely on policy statements and interpretative rules to some extent; at many 
agencies, these less formal documents account for 90 percent or more of the agency’s 
‘rules.’” (citing Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 1992 Duke L.J. 1463)). 
 168. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 
1189, 1224-25, 1227-28 (1986). 
 169. Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:  Recommendations for 
Reform, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 461, 465-67 (describing a five-step sequential evaluation process 
for disability, the listing of numerous impairments that are considered per se disabling, and 
the use of “grids” to determine the availability of jobs for claimants with standard exertional 
impairments and vocational factors). 
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rulemaking as a means of policy formation because it provides agencies a 
greater chance of seeing their rule become law, while other forms of agency 
policymaking would still face more stringent (even if not perhaps especially 
stringent) forms of judicial oversight. 
On the other hand, democracy index rulemaking would ensure that the 
kinds of considerations that the analytical requirements forced agencies to 
consider would likely be examined.  If the agency decided to use a broadly 
participatory process, it would by definition be considering the interests of 
various groups and individuals.  If the agency decided not to use a broadly 
participatory process, then courts would, during the process of judicial 
review, be forced to inject these kinds of considerations into its analysis of 
the final agency action. 
At the least, democracy index rulemaking would lead to a more equitable 
consideration of relevant interests.  In perhaps one of the clearest examples 
of the application of capture theory, the analytical requirements prioritize 
the concerns of particular groups:  environmental groups,170 the small 
business community,171 the business community in general,172 state 
interests,173 and traditional values groups.174  Democracy index rulemaking 
would require—if an agency wants to receive deliberative deference—that 
it take account of all relevant interests and groups, thereby not giving 
particular groups preferences. 
C.  Mitigation of the Traditional Participatory Costs 
Participation in administrative action usually comes at significant cost.  
For one thing, it may interfere with the authority of the agency to set and 
pursue its own agenda.  Take citizen suits, for instance.  These were 
originally intended to counteract potential agency capture, and to provide 
citizens with a means of obtaining enforcement of the laws on their own.175  
This is why many of those whom might be sympathetic to democracy index 
rulemaking—other civic republican administrative law scholars—have 
 
 170. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000). 
 171. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2000). 
 172. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 
638-42 (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), repealed by Exec. Order 
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 642 (2000) (requiring 
analysis of potential takings of private property). 
 173. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1538, 1571 (2000); 
Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987), repealed by Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 10(b), 3 
D.F.R. 206, 211 (1999) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 6461 (2000) (requiring 
consideration of “federalism” concerns). 
 174. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987), repealed by Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 
10(b), 3 D.F.R. 206, 211 (1999) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 6461 (2000) (requiring 
an analysis of the impact of regulations on family considerations).  
 175. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal 
Environmental Law, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 311, 334 (observing that 
Congress established citizen suit provisions in each of the environmental statutes to prevent 
agency capture). 
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found citizen suits to be a valuable tool of legal enforcement.176  Yet citizen 
suits pose a real danger to agency autonomy, as demonstrated by the 
practice of citizen suits pursuant to the Clean Water Act.177  The Clean 
Water Act creates a statutory standard of zero discharge as a means of 
eliminating all pollution, not just excessively harmful pollution.178  Given 
this standard, it would be nearly impossible for the EPA to fully enforce the 
legal regime, so citizen suits have become a major means of enforcing the 
Clean Water Act.179  If a citizen wins such a lawsuit, then the EPA usually 
faces some sort of coercive relief—an order to start again with its 
rulemaking process, an order to pay damages, or so on. 
This may have its good features.  Organizations such as the Atlantic 
Legal Foundation, which may serve a valuable role in the administrative 
process, use the Clean Water Act to target large firms whose past practices 
indicate that they might be likely to pollute again.180  The interest 
representation approach might view these citizen suits positively, because 
they provide a means of participation for potentially disenfranchised 
groups.  But consider the costs:  an organization bringing a citizen suit 
under the Clean Water Act would have substantial authority over an agency 
program, potentially even having the power in court to invalidate an entire 
agency regulatory regime.  By contrast, democracy index rulemaking would 
make participation by these groups encouraged and therefore more likely, 
but would not provide such groups with a veto power over agency action. 
Participation in administrative action also might be problematic because 
it might overwhelm agencies with information.181  In democracy index 
 
 176. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 168 (1992) (suggesting that Lujan, properly understood, 
provides Congress with the flexibility to create a system of bounties for citizen enforcement 
or to create property rights in the benefits provided by regulatory statute). 
 177. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000). 
 178. Id. § 1251(a)(1) (“[I]t is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the 
navigable waters be eliminated . . . .”). 
 179. Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards:  How Environmental 
Citizen Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in Environmental Politics:  Public Costs, 
Private Rewards 105 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).  Greve writes the 
following: 
An analysis of 29 cases between 1983 and 1985 showed that more than 65 percent 
of the settlements [under Clean Water Act citizen suits], totaling slightly under 
$1,000,000, went to environmental groups.  Another analysis of 30 Clean Water 
Act citizen suits against alleged polluters in Connecticut between 1983 and 1986 
showed that the total settlement of more than $1.5 million included $492,036 in 
attorney’s fees to the [National Resources Defense Council] and the Connecticut 
Fund for the Environment (who had brought the vast majority of these cases) and 
$869,500 to the Open Space Institute, an organization established by and affiliated 
with the NRDC.  No fines were paid to the Treasury in these cases. 
Id. at 110. 
 180. Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental 
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act:  Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-
Independent Values, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 337, 402 (1988). 
 181. Herbert A. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs 94 (1983).  Christopher Schroeder has 
written that “comprehensive rationality . . . reduces choice to an analysis of the efficacy of 
available alternatives to achieve predetermined goals . . . inevitably entail[ing] 
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rulemaking, though, this seems less likely to happen.  Agencies will have 
complete and essentially unreviewable control over the precise notice and 
comment process that it wants to utilize, meaning that it is less likely to 
pick a path that would result in information overload.  In the instance of 
DNC, the fact that small groups must eventually submit formal statements 
to the agency means that the agency will be dealing with discrete 
documents cataloguing the sentiments of relevant participants. 
III.  CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES 
Many might worry that democracy index rulemaking would interfere 
with the traditional distribution of power among the central players in 
administrative law:  agencies, courts, Congress, and the President.  This 
claim is mostly untrue, because the main systems of oversight and influence 
that these institutions currently use would generally remain in place.  The 
ways that democracy index rulemaking changes these systems of oversight 
and influence (as in the case of analytical requirements imposed by 
Congress or the President) leads to a more desirable regime of 
administrative law. 
A.  Agencies 
It might be argued that, pursuant to democracy index rulemaking, 
agencies would lose substantial autonomy, and this would be quite 
undesirable.  But, no matter how the agency responds to the series of 
incentives created by democracy index rulemaking, this statement is almost 
certainly false.  The agency faces absolutely no new obligations of any sort.  
If the agency (successfully) pursues deliberative deference with any kind of 
frequency, then it will find its decisions treated with great deference under 
democracy index rulemaking, so if anything it would find its relative power 
increased.  If the agency engages NNC but due to a dearth of comments  
finds that it is spending its resources to obtain deliberative deference and is 
not receiving such deference, it can use the deliberative deference safe 
harbor of DNC instead. 
If the agency decides to use NNC and decides not to aggressively pursue 
many comments, then it will receive precisely the same amount of 
deference it receives under the current rulemaking regime:  arbitrary and 
capricious deference.  If this were the result, the agency would be just as 
powerful as it is under the current regime of administrative law.  If the 
agency decides to use NNC and is successful in attracting many comments, 
then the agency will likely have even more autonomy and authority than it 
does pursuant to the current regime, because under the “clear and 
substantial error” standard of review it will be much more likely to have its 
legislative rule upheld in court. 
 
simplification, both in the specification of goals and in the modeling methods employed to 
predict the extent to which alternatives achieve them.” Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights 
Against Risks, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 495, 502 n.29 (1986) (citation omitted). 
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If the agency decides to use DNC, it is unclear whether it would initially 
have to commit more resources to rulemaking than it currently commits 
using NNC.  Take the closest current analogue to DNC, negotiated 
rulemaking.  Cary Coglianese has argued that “[n]o matter what one 
concludes about the impact of negotiated rulemaking on the duration of the 
regulatory process, negotiated rulemaking still demands more time and 
effort on the part of the participants than does conventional rulemaking.”182 
Philip Harter, the original intellectual architect of negotiated rulemaking, 
has himself noted that “[r]eg negs are intense activities:  participating in one 
can be expensive and time consuming.”183  One study has indicated that 
negotiated rulemakings require twice as much in terms of organizational 
resources compared to normal rulemaking.184 
However, as an empirical matter, it may not be true that DNC is more 
problematic in terms of the expenditure of resources and speech with which 
a rule can be promulgated.185  Again, turning to negotiated rulemaking as 
the closest analogue, even if negotiated rulemaking requires an intense 
 
 182. Coglianese, supra note 129, at 415; see also Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, 
Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 60, 109 (2000) 
(“This is one claim about reg neg that has no counterclaim.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering 
Stakeholders:  Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 411, 457 (2000) (stating that “all commentators agree that negotiated 
rulemaking is an intensive process requiring a concentrated devotion of resources by the 
agency and private negotiation participants”). 
 183. Philip Harter, Fear of Commitment:  An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 Duke L.J. 
1389, 1420-21 (1997) (stating that negotiated rulemaking “is unquestionably an intense 
process”); see, e.g., Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking:  How Government Agencies Write 
Law and Make Policy 190 (1994) (stating that negotiated rulemaking demands an 
“extraordinary commitment of time” from individuals and that “negotiation sessions 
themselves are demanding activities that can wreak havoc with normal work 
responsibilities”); Daniel Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Form of Public Participation, 
in Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation:  Evaluating Models for Environmental 
Discourse 223, 232 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995) (“Although negotiation may not take 
more time overall than a conventional rulemaking, the time demands are more 
concentrated.”); Freeman & Langbein, supra note 182, at 97 n.176 (noting the “resource-
intensive nature of reg neg”); Steven Kelman, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for 
Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking, 11 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 178, 200 (1992) 
(noting that “service in regulatory negotiations has proven to be quite time-consuming 
compared to the adversary process, which creates a problem for organizations with limited 
resources”); Office of Policy, Planning and Evaulation, Envtl. Prot. Agency, An Assessment 
of EPA’s Negotiated Rulemaking Activities (1987), reprinted in Reg. Neg. Sourcebook, 
supra note 36, at 23, 30 (noting that “EPA managers who have been the Agency’s 
negotiators have devoted far more time to the negotiations in which they were involved than 
they ordinarily would spend on a single rulemaking effort”); Ellen Siegler, Regulatory 
Negotiations:  A Practical Perspective, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,647, 10,651 (1992) (“A major 
disadvantage of the reg-neg process is that it can be extremely resource-intensive and 
stressful.”). 
 184. Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus 
Conventional Rule Making:  Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. Pub. 
Admin. Res. & Theory 599, 620 (2000). 
 185. Coglianese, supra note 129, at 415 n.134 (“As discussed . . .  the evidence does not 
support such a conclusion.”). 
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agency commitment, it may result in a rule more quickly than NNC,186 
which the agency presumably would like, and because this process is 
quicker it ultimately might result in less agency expenditure of resources. 
The noted study of negotiated rulemaking conducted by Cornelius 
Kerwin and Patrick Furlong found that at the EPA regular legislative rules 
took an average of 3.0 years (1108 days) to complete, while the four 
negotiated rules took only 2.1 years (778 days).187  This data led Kerwin 
and Furlong to conclude that negotiated rulemaking would be “more 
expeditious”188 than normal rulemaking, which echoed the findings of a 
National Performance Review Report on this subject.189  Because DNC 
does not require a clear consensus, as negotiated rulemaking does, it is 
likely that DNC would move along even more rapidly, conferring a 
meaningful benefit. 
Even assuming, though, that DNC was resource intensive and potentially 
more time consuming than negotiated rulemaking, it still does not 
fundamentally interfere with agency autonomy.  Agencies will have 
selected, with clear knowledge of the consequences, this particular form of 
rulemaking.  And, more fundamentally, even if it takes more time and more 
resources to use this kind of process, agencies have a much greater chance 
that their rule will be upheld in court than they currently enjoy.  It seems 
rather clear that, even if it requires slightly more money and slightly more 
 
 186. The EPA’s first study of its initial regulatory negotiations concluded these rules were 
promulgated more quickly and at less cost. Reg. Neg. Sourcebook, supra note 36, at 29.  The 
EPA calculated that regulatory negotiations took half the time and money it would have to 
expend otherwise. Id. at 29, 32. 
 187. Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking:  An Empirical Test 
of Theory, 2 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 113, 134 (1992). 
 188. Id. at 124. 
 189. Office of the Vice President, Accompanying Report of the National Performance 
Review:  Improving Regulatory Systems 32-33 n.8 (1993) (citing Kerwin & Furlong, supra 
note 187, at 124).  Cary Coglianese has disagreed with this assessment: 
In contrast to the eleven-month time savings suggested by Kerwin and Furlong, 
my analysis of all of EPA’s negotiated rules suggests (at most) little more than 
three months savings compared with the rules issued in the period studied by 
Kerwin and Furlong, a difference which could well be accounted for by choices of 
measurement.  When the EPA’s three pending negotiated rules are added, the time 
savings between the two procedures disappears altogether.  If we were to assume, 
for sake of estimation, that the EPA had promulgated all three pending rules at the 
end of December 1996, the average time for promulgating negotiated rules at EPA 
would increase to 3.1 years (1129 days), three weeks longer than the average 
reported by Kerwin and Furlong for all EPA rules.   
  The whole of the available evidence on the time span of EPA’s negotiated rules 
markedly contrasts with the claims of considerable time savings attributed to 
negotiated rulemaking.  Of course, any comparison of negotiated and conventional 
rules may have its limits because the time it takes to develop rules is surely 
affected by factors other than just the use or nonuse of formal negotiated 
procedures.  Even though the EPA has conducted the most negotiated rulemakings 
of any agency, it still has only promulgated 12 rules (and has only three others 
pending). 
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus:  The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 Duke L.J. 1255, at 1283-85 (1997). 
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time initially, an agency is much less likely to have to go through the 
rulemaking process again to try to create a new rule, which will result in 
saved resources. 
Those who would argue that agencies responding to democracy index 
rulemaking incentives would be subverting the technocratic rationales for 
the existence of agency rulemaking are misunderstanding the nature of 
public participation and what it contributes to democracy index rulemaking.  
For one thing, as we know from research into forms of jury activity, 
average citizens do not generally reach different results than do legal 
professionals in evaluating complex facts.  We know from empirical 
research into civil juries that average-citizen jurors can be competent as fact 
finders.190  Even in complex cases—cases that might involve a degree of 
technical complexity similar to many agency determinations—jury 
decisions have overlapped with expert determinations.191  True, many if not 
most agency determinations really are not “legal” determinations, but the 
complex factual issues that must be resolved in these challenging civil jury 
trials are not that different.  Beyond that, because the agency has complete 
control over notice and comment pursuant to democracy index rulemaking, 
it might be able to manipulate the system to give it more helpful 
information, furthering its technocratic expertise. 
In the case of DNC, this continued technocratic capacity would be 
present while not undermining the participatory virtues of DNC.  The 
precise manner in which DNC is designed might mitigate concerns that 
small group members will defer to the expertise of the agency, as displayed 
by the agency briefing book and the initial agency presentation to the larger 
group.  In one study of seven regimes of deliberative democracy, for 
instance, Mark Button and Kevin Mattson found that participants deferred 
to experts quite a bit.192  With DNC, though, because small groups would 
have their own counsel and would meet without the agency members 
always present, members of these juries should avoid excessive deference 
to perceived expertise, a more significant problem (because of the hyper-
technical nature of many agency rules) in the context of democracy index 
rulemaking than in the context of the Deliberation Day discussions (which 
involve major national political issues). 
Some might worry that using DNC would create an unnecessary degree 
of polarization within the agency, or, at a minimum, within the deliberating 
small groups if the agency uses DNC.  As Cass Sunstein has argued, 
“[g]roup polarization is among the most robust patterns found in 
 
 190. See Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:  Taking Stock After Twelve 
Years, in Verdict:  Assessing the Civil Jury System 181, 233-35 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); 
Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury:  An Empirical Perspective, 40 
Ariz. L. Rev. 849, 898-99 (1999). 
 191. Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury:  Confronting the Myths 
About Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets, and Outrageous Damage Awards 49-173 (1995). 
 192. Button & Mattson, supra note 128, at 610 . 
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deliberating bodies.”193  Sunstein has further argued that the deliberative 
settings envisioned in DNC “do not polarize, at least not systematically; this 
result is undoubtedly a product of the distinctive setting, in which materials 
are presented on each issue, with corresponding claims of fact and 
value.”194 
This is because DNC discussions are “overseen by a moderator”195 and 
are “highly diverse.”196  Participants receive “a set of written materials that 
[attempt] to be balanced and that [contain] detailed arguments for both 
sides.  The likely consequence would be to move people in different 
directions from those that would be expected by simple group discussion, 
unaffected by authoritative external materials.”197  Because small group 
members can submit questions to outside experts, there is not the problem 
that many regular juries have of being locked into a secluded and therefore 
polarizing conversation.  Participants do vote, and may disagree, but their 
votes are secret.  There could even be disagreement; it is conceivable that 
the final small group report could indicate why some members of the group 
felt x, but why some members of the group believed not x.  Finally, the fact 
that there is not a clear binary answer that the group must eventually reach 
(even if it must vote on a series of issues along the way), but rather must 
submit a general evaluation of a rule, means that the group will most likely 
not polarize. 
Those who might view agencies more cynically might have opposite 
concerns; agencies might manipulate democracy index rulemaking to 
receive deference for unwise and possibly rent-seeking rules, and thereby 
become more powerful.  As a matter of institutional design, though, this 
seemingly would be quite difficult.  If the agency used NNC and received 
any kind of deference it would be because the agency received many 
comments (and many helpful and probing comments), to which the agency 
would have to respond, or have its rule invalidated (even using deliberative 
deference).198 
If the agency used DNC, one might worry that the agency would convene 
these juries and manipulate their operation, possibly to secure approval for 
their rules, or, in the alternative, not secure the approval of the jury for the 
rule, but ignore the jury suggestion and provide some sort of suggestion.  
The ALMs—and the presence of outside counsel retained by the juries—
would hamper the capacity of the agency to manipulate jury deliberations.  
The hard look review of agency departure from jury suggestions would 
 
 193. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?  Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 
71, 85 (2000). 
 194. Id. at 73 n.6. 
 195. Id. at 117. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Int’l Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, 
C.J., concurring) (“[An] agency [must] set forth with clarity the grounds for its rejection of 
opposing views.”). 
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ensure that agencies could not, in the absence of a compelling reason, 
ignore the jury suggestions. 
B.  Judicial Review 
It may be argued that democracy index rulemaking does not really 
provide agencies with any true incentive at all, because in return for a 
potentially more laborious rulemaking process they will be presented with a 
classic non-reward:  a change in the standard of judicial review.  Perhaps 
standards of review do not matter because, as Richard Pierce once wrote, 
“the fate of a major agency policy decision reviewed by the D.C. Circuit 
will vary with the composition of the panel that reviews the agency 
action.”199 
This statement resembles (if not exactly replicates) the “attitudinal 
model” that political scientists sometimes use to study judicial decisions.200 
We have also seen this concept in administrative law scholarship, most 
notably in the study of D.C. Circuit decisions conducted by Richard 
Revesz.201  Of particular relevance to democracy index rulemaking, Revesz 
found that the party that appointed a judge was an important factor in 
predicting whether that judge took a “hard look” at the problem the court 
was addressing.202  Studies of judicial review in the aftermath of 
Chevron,203 however, seem to indicate that the standard of review in 
administrative law does matter.204  Even if standards of review did not 
affect cases as a legal matter, consider the political pressure brought to bear 
on a court by a deliberative deference-inducing agency process:  many 
powerful interests and members of the public coalescing in order to 
participate in, and eventually agree, to an agency rule.  A court does not 
need a lenient standard of review—and one need not be a legalist—to 
believe that a court is more likely to defer to the agency in that context. 
 
 199. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law:  Political Polarity on 
the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 Duke 
L.J. 300, 300. 
 200. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism:  A Case of 
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251, 252-53, 265 (1997). 
 201. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
Va. L. Rev. 1717, 1719 (1997) (concluding, in part, that “ideology significantly influences 
judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit”).  Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit 
criticized the Revesz study. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the 
D.C. Circuit, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1335 (1998). 
 202. Revesz, supra note 201, at 1729-31. 
 203. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 204. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 109, at 1060.  Later articles seem to have modified 
this conclusion. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:  An Empirical Study of the 
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 59 (1998). See 
generally Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2637, 2645 (2003) 
(“Several commentators have observed after conducting various studies of the case law that 
the effect of Chevron on judicial outcomes has not been as significant as one might have 
expected, although many have found some increased level of judicial deference to agency 
interpretations.”). 
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Assuming that standards of review do matter, one might argue that 
agencies promulgating legislative rules already receive substantial 
deference.  But we know from Schuck and Elliott’s study that the standards 
of review currently used by courts are not fully deferential.  If standards of 
review do matter, and if they could be more relaxed, do agencies truly care 
about them?  The Mashaw and Harfst study, as much as any ossification 
study, showed how the activities of agencies are thwarted by courts, so it is 
hard to imagine that the answer is no.  In any event, the enticement of no 
pre-enforcement review plus a more deferential standard of review might do 
together what either inducement could not do on its own. 
What about the argument that democracy index rulemaking would create 
standards of review which are either too ambiguous (in the case of NNC, 
because it is a sliding scale) or too determinate (in the case of DNC)?  In the 
context of NNC, some might enter the debate about rules and standards205 
and argue that judicial review would be unclear because it would not be 
fixed.  A floating standard of review would be used to analyze the 
possibility of pre-enforcement review and eventual review.  But this 
standard, while floating, would be fairly easy to ascertain; it would involve 
the simple exercise of counting the number of comments submitted, 
discounted by the range of parties submitting these comments.  Because 
administrative law relies so much on the activities of perhaps only two 
courts (the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court), over time even these 
standards would begin to adopt rule-like qualities.  And, if the agency found 
these standards to be troubling and hard to predict, it could always opt 
either for NNC rulemaking with no deliberative deference or for DNC and 
guaranteed deliberative deference. 
 
 205. See Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 49-50 (1975) 
(criticizing the use of rules); Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 15-63 (1987) 
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of law”); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985) (highlighting 
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Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 
1988 Duke L.J. 819, 841-42 (criticizing the use of rules in drafting administrative law 
statutes); Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant:  Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 585, 599 (1994) (arguing that rules almost inevitably become “impossibly 
cumbersome and complex”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 62-69, 95, 98 (1992) (discussing debate on the Court about 
rules versus standards); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 956-57 
(1995) (outlining major rules versus standards arguments). 
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Even more fundamentally, of course, it is hard to argue that using this 
floating standard of review would make judicial review of agency action 
less determinate than the current system of review.  In Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,206 
the Supreme Court outlined a fairly straightforward list of four parts of an 
agency decision that would be evaluated in ruling on the agency action.207  
As Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy have documented, this clear standard 
was not clearly and consistently applied in later cases.208  Courts and 
agencies survived for decades, even before any attempts were successful to 
bring rules into judicial review, and this is not even mentioning the age of 
administrative common law that preceded the APA.  Before Chevron, for 
instance, there was Skidmore v. Swift & Co.209 and its standards-like 
system, which stated that the standard of review would be determined by 
agency consistency with prior interpretations, the degree of expertise the 
agency brought to the issue, and other contextual issues.210  These 
considerations may continue to be relevant in the supposedly rules-like 
system of Chevron,211 leaving us still in a standards-like system. 
C.  Institutional Political Control 
What would democracy index rulemaking do to the regime of 
institutional political oversight that is at the heart of administrative law?  
Take Congress, for instance.  On one hand, it is possible that Congress has 
 
 206. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 207. Id. at 43 (stating that reviewing courts should examine whether the agency analyzed 
issues that Congress wanted it to, whether the agency ignored an important part of the 
regulatory problem, whether the agency’s explanation was consistent with the evidence, and 
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 208. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in 
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 Duke L.J. 1051, 1067 (1995).  Shapiro 
and Levy note the following: 
In the fifty-six cases that we surveyed, the Court cited State Farm only fifteen 
times in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to an adjudicatory or 
rulemaking decision, and only four of the fifteen opinions mention the State Farm 
criteria. 
  Because the Supreme Court has not promoted use of the State Farm criteria, the 
definition of “arbitrary and capricious” remains relatively indeterminate.  In the 
118 cases that we surveyed, circuit courts cited State Farm only forty-five times in 
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to an adjudicatory or a rulemaking 
decision, and only thirteen of the forty-five cases mentioned the State Farm 
criteria. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 209. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 210. Id. at 140. 
 211. The considerations that Skidmore stated are relevant to the standard of review might 
be relevant at the second stage of Chevron. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 
U.S. 402, 416-20 (1993) (discussing how the administrative agency had adopted “a variety 
of approaches” to the question over the years, and noting that the lack of consistency was 
relevant but not dispositive to the reasonableness of the interpretation); Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992) (mentioning that the particular agency position had been 
“consistently held” in finding that it was reasonable). 
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exercised no control over administrative agencies in the first place,212 so 
democracy index rulemaking could not interrupt something that does not 
even exist.  When Congress has tried to use procedures to control 
agencies—such as the legislative veto—it eventually utilized these 
procedures so infrequently that they became ineffective.213 
Assuming this view is wrong, and that the more contemporary view that 
a system of “congressional dominance”214 or something less drastic is a 
reality, Congress still would have the same powers of oversight pursuant to 
democracy index rulemaking that it did under the old regime.  Congress 
would still be able to monitor the actions of administrative agencies at a 
formal and informal level.215  Congress would still be able to hold 
hearings216 and initiate investigations, and by so doing would be able to 
communicate to the agency how Congress felt about particular issues.  The 
possibility that Congress could cut funding—or require or prevent the 
agency from taking action—would still serve as real threats to an agency, 
which may decide to initiate or not initiate a rule as a result, or may choose 
a particular rulemaking form because of these threats.  In the context of 
democracy index rulemaking, this might mean that agencies would not 
initiate rulemaking and thereby even raise the possibility of popular 
influence.  If they did initiate rulemaking, and particularly if they used 
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Control?  Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 
767 (1983); see also Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 274 (1987); Mathew D. 
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:  Police Patrols 
Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 176 (1984). 
 215. See Joel D. Auerbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye:  The Politics of Congressional 
Oversight 14-15, 130-44 (1990). 
 216. See Morris S. Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy 155 (1976) (analyzing the 
role of hearings as a form of legislative oversight). 
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DNC, agencies would still have this congressional control and power in 
mind when they decided what rule to propose to juries, and whether to 
accept the suggestions of these juries. 
If this was not enough, the Congressional Review Act217 would still be in 
effect as a means of asserting congressional control over agency action.218  
The agency acting under democracy index rulemaking would still have to 
submit reports to the comptroller general and to each house of Congress 
about legislative rules.219  The agency would still have to provide Congress 
with information about this rule,220 and Congress would still have the 
capacity to disapprove the rule within sixty days of the receipt of the agency 
report.221  Congress would still have the power to request the comptroller 
general to conduct an independent examination of the rule before deciding 
if it wants to overturn the rule.222  Congress could still alter notice and 
comment by passing revisions of the APA, or more realistically by 
changing notice and comment procedures in agency-enabling or re-
authorization statutes. 
Likewise, the executive would still have many of its traditional powers 
over the administrative state.  The executive would have substantial control 
over agency appointments, formal and informal control over budgets and 
general agency rules, and so on.  And even though analytical 
requirements—requirements that the agency was required to follow in the 
previous regime—would be reduced, if an agency issues a rule, it might 
give that rule a form of legitimacy because of its popular pedigree, thereby 
giving the executive branch potentially greater power by giving it the 
chance to issue rules with greater perceived legitimacy.  The President 
could stand forward and declare that the rule had a form of popular 
legitimacy, and that was why the administration supported the rule.  Given 
that this rule would likely face a less problematic legal path, this less 
problematic political path would be a welcome alternative. 
Recall also that one of the items that courts would be examining when 
they review administrative actions under democracy index rulemaking 
would be whether the agency has followed what Congress and the executive 
have said that the agency should do.  In the context of negotiated 
rulemaking, Bill Funk has argued that negotiated rules largely ignored the 
desires of the relevant statutes.223  Funk argued instead that negotiated rules 
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reflect the interests of powerful interest groups.224  Funk might argue that 
the same might happen with the introduction of the democracy index 
system.  Yet Funk’s article, in the context of its discussion of negotiated 
rulemaking and in the context of its application to the democracy index 
system, ignores one simple fact: Courts would still review rules to ensure 
compliance with congressional wishes.  Indeed, it is the potentially limited 
intrusion on the role of Congress and the President that makes the 
democracy index system one that could actually be passed, in contrast to 
some of the other institutional design ideas of other civic republican 
scholarship.225 
It is true that, unlike with agency and congressional control, many of the 
pillars of executive control over the administrative state would be 
dismantled by democracy index rulemaking.  Starting with Executive Order 
12,291, issued during the first thirty days of the Reagan Administration, a 
greater portion of executive control over agency action has been centralized 
in the OMB.226  These orders required a “regulatory impact” analysis of 
rules, including a cost-benefit analysis.227  They gave OMB the capacity to 
prevent the publication of a final rule.228  Democracy index rulemaking 
would largely do away with many of the analytical requirements that are 
part of executive orders. 
As a practical matter, this will not make much difference.  Even at the 
peak of the use of this power, only one out of thirty rules that OMB even 
reviewed was returned to the agencies or otherwise withdrawn because of 
OMB action, even at the peak of the use of this power.229  The analytical 
requirements issued in these executive orders would still be in place during 
many NNC procedures because of the sliding scale of analytical 
requirements.  Indeed, it is very possible that democracy index rulemaking 
would increase executive power. 
 
 224. Id. at 61. 
 225. Croley, supra note 31, at 81.  Croley states that 
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Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 251, 259-60 (1992). 
    
2005] DEMOCRACY INDEX RULEMAKING 125 
D.  Constitutional and Statutory Law Concerns 
Does democracy index rulemaking have any significant constitutional 
flaws?  NNC (with deliberative deference) seems to be much less 
constitutionally problematic than DNC.  DNC clearly involves the 
empowerment of a group of citizens, but it involves empowering these 
citizens as agents and parts of the government, like juries, and is therefore 
unproblematic.  Even if we assumed that this was not like a jury system, but 
was instead a “double delegation”230 from a constitutionally identified 
branch of government, to an agency, to another institution, this would not 
be problematic.  One might presume that private entities acting as public 
officials will still pursue their private interests,231 and that empowering 
private groups raises accountability concerns because these private groups 
are not beholden to citizens or other parts of the government as true public 
officials would be.232  This is why the two examples of the Court using the 
non-delegation doctrine to invalidate a statute both involved congressional 
delegation to private organizations or entities.233 
These so-called “subdelegations” or “double delegations” are 
unproblematic if the agency still maintains effective control over the actions 
of the private entity.  In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,234 for 
instance, the Court upheld a federal statute that allowed coal producers to 
propose minimum prices to a public commission, because the public 
commission itself could decide whether to approve, disapprove, or modify 
them.  In the case of democracy index rulemaking, if the agency used DNC, 
it would still have final authority over whether or not to adopt the 
comments proposed by the two juries, and the agency would have the initial 
authority to decide whether or not to use DNC in the first place. 
Democracy index rulemaking would also not run afoul of existing 
statutory regimes.  FACA has been cited by some as a provision that may 
make negotiated rulemaking problematic,235 and likewise might be cited as 
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a law that would make democracy index rulemaking problematic.  FACA 
creates a system of rules regarding the creation of “advisory committees,” 
but by ensuring that all meetings of DNC juries be open to the public,236 
even with the negatives that would entail,237 democracy index rulemaking 
would satisfy one major FACA requirement.  Also, if an agency decided to 
use DNC, it could submit its final design of the relevant juries to the 
General Services Administration, as currently required, thereby avoiding 
another major FACA hurdle.238  The system of picking representatives 
during DNC (requiring “fairly balanced” stakeholder representation, and 
using a random process for selecting general members of the public) would 
ensure that DNC meets the FACA “fairly balanced” requirement.239 
Democracy index rulemaking also does not seem to cause any problems 
under the APA (aside from the obvious issues related to the new standards 
and systems of judicial review).  If the agency decides to use NNC, then 
there are clearly no APA concerns.  If the agency decides to use DNC, it 
would still have to submit the proposed rule for NNC. 
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nuclear Resources Defense 
Council,240 the Court indicated that many parts of the language of section 
553 of the APA241 are mandatory (ceilings as well as floors).242  
Democracy index rulemaking, by so strongly encouraging the use of special 
and perhaps additional procedures (more efforts during NNC, or the use of 
DNC), repudiates Vermont Yankee.  But Vermont Yankee was concerned 
about courts “impos[ing] [additional procedural rights] if the agencies have 
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not chosen to grant them.”243  Incentives are not the same thing as the kinds 
of impositions that Vermont Yankee was referencing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is hard to argue that, no matter what the institutional arrangement, 
public participation in administrative rulemaking is a bad idea.  The 
founders of the administrative state did not think this, which is why they 
created the notice and comment procedure in the first place.  The members 
of Congress do not think this, which is why they include seemingly greater 
and greater provisions for public participation in each new statute related to 
agency rulemaking.  But the critics of public participation in administrative 
rulemaking are on to something:  Public participation can have its costs. 
Democracy index rulemaking tries to create a way around this, by 
encouraging rather than requiring public participation.  This structure makes 
participation more likely, but balances that with a respect for agency 
autonomy and expertise.  Of all of the incentives that could be used, 
democracy index rulemaking seemingly picks one that agencies truly care 
about, judicial review, thereby strongly encouraging agencies to involve the 
public but also creating the potential for de-ossification and avoiding 
double and excessive oversight of agency action.  Because of these clear 
positives, the central idea behind the democracy index concept has wide 
applicability, to areas like ex parte contacts, the interpretation of agency-
enabling acts, and so on.  The simple idea behind the democracy index—the 
more and the better the democratic process, the better the result should be 
treated—has profound implications for administrative law and for other 
areas of law.  But every big idea has to start with one compelling example 
of why it would work, and the creation of democracy index rulemaking is 
perfect for this task. 
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